



Anarchist Urban Planning & Place Theory



by Olympia Tvester



For any inquisitor, be they an urban planner, architect, or any environmental designer, or be they anarchists from any of these fields or any anarchist in general, this book answers numerous fundamental questions, including:

- How anarchism theoretically applies to the environmental design fields, especially urban planning
- The meaning of "place" within and outside of ownership/capitalist constructs
- The true reasons behind why urban planners experience cognitive dissonance
- What *actually* creates the greatest human meaning through physical design
- What morality *truly* is outside of ownership constructs
- The role of the planner and designer in an anarchist world

The answers to these questions may also prove helpful to anyone involved in any kind of design project, intentional community creation, conflict resolution, or any other individual or collective endeavor.

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PREFACE

Originally written as an academic text, I compiled this work in a zine form here for easy and inexpensive distribution within the anarchist community. I wrote the text to address and help solve many core theoretical problems within the field of specifically urban planning, but for any anarchist in general who might be reading this text, I believe that the concepts herein also provide a groundwork of theory that could be brought into literally *any* anarchist project, be it intentional community creation, conflict resolution, design projects, or any kind of advocacy endeavor. Working individually or as a collective, the concepts herein concerning morality and meaning creation may help you more fully realize your common values and increase your effectiveness.

Also, as this work is so very field specific in nature, be aware that one may come across terms or concepts which may be foreign to the general reader. And though extensive definitions and explanations are included within the text, I can only imagine that there will still be instances when a field concept here or there might be outside the reader's scope of understanding. In this edition, I include no glossary of any type, nor an index. If a further explanation is needed, I would encourage you to go online, look in a dictionary, or explore a public library.

The project of this text began during my first year of college. I by happenstance found the book *A Pattern Language* (Alexander, et al 1977) on a coffee table in a public building. Of everyone I asked, no one claimed it, so I took it home and it, very literally, sparked the driving force within me to seek to understand what creates the greatest meaning for human beings through physical design. As I read it, I was captivated by the possibility of creating the most “wonderful,” “amazing,” and “meaningful” places imaginable, but reading that book also led me to feel like there was something missing from their analysis. So my search continued. It has gone on for nearly twelve years now and this text is the culmination of that search.

The journey toward the completed realization of this written work has been one of personal self-realization, too, as I found my own life to be a reflection of the larger society. In this journey, while concepts of religion, gender, capitalism, and morality itself in my personal life fell into critical dissection and analysis, simultaneously I could see the core constituents of these subjects to also be alive and well in the fields of planning and architecture of which I had so much passion and care for. I can only hope that as others read this, it will awaken in them self-realizations and inner liberations also.

The theories within this text are by no means complete, but perhaps hold some of the keys to a revolution in the fields of urban planning and design. These theories may help planners and designers understand the soup of discontent that they are currently in and to understand how, in theory, to get out. This text is primarily not about application, but about theory. I also hope that as academics and practitioners read, they will understand the path that they must take in our human evolution locally and as a global society, and then make moves to educate others and eventually eliminate the system — for the total liberation of this planet and its people.

Furthermore, a word of warning to the reader, in this work I use only gender neutral pronouns, which many people may not be accustomed to. As gender tends to be very much an oppressive construct, to move toward that world of complete liberation — no male nor female pronouns are used herein. Admittedly,

this aspect of the text may be difficult to read at first, but every step we can consciously take toward liberation, we very much need to.

As well, as this text takes an anarchist perspective not often used by urban planners and design professionals, this too may greatly challenge how some readers think about the world. Some may think this is an “unrealistic perspective.” Unto you I would say to please consider the value of being collectively exhaustive in your search for truth.

Urban and regional planning, as well as architecture, are often perceived as very much altruistic undertakings. May this work help take that altruism to a new dimension of ultimate meaningfulness, liberty, and equality for all people.

Olympia Tveter
December 2009

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

We Were Born Into a World Where:

Dreams and desires have been locked within the cages of psychotherapeutic interpretations;

Revolt has been bound with the fetters of moribund leftist ideologies;

Creativity has been enslaved to the sadistic masters, art and literature;

The marvelous has been handcuffed to the cops of mysticism and mythology;

Reality has lost the ability of laugh at itself and its foibles and so suppresses a truly playful spirit;

Thought has become a rigidly armored fortress protecting its ideological foundations from every criticism;

Revolution has had its passion organized out of existence leaving only structural rigor mortis where once insurgency breathed and danced.

The world has ceased to bring forth amazing monsters;

It is no longer a conduit for the marvelous; It has lost touch with the convulsive beauty of love and lust;

It can no longer give birth to babes with wings;

It has ceased growing and begun to rot;

It has suppressed surreality wherever this marvelous flower has bloomed.

– Wolfi Landstreicher (2004)

In the present turmoil of theory, the purpose of this book, is to begin a new dialogue about the theoretical construction of “place” — to suggest the possibility of new design theory to guide the fields of urban planning and architecture, particularly from a contemporary anarchist perspective. The central concept of these possible new theories is that the perception of unique differentiation is the *only* factor that determines meaning in the lives of human beings. This text also draws conclusions about how the concept of morality itself occurs as a function of personal orientation in the world. Herein are deduced these possibilities primarily through an analysis and interpretation of the theories within the book *The Image of the City*, by Kevin Lynch (1960).

In the past several hundred years, the promise of creating the most meaningful environments for people has been a greatly debated topic. From Sitte and Burnham to Kunstler and Calthorp – social scientists to environmental designers influenced by capitalism, Marxism, and the Enlightenment have sought to pick apart what precisely provides people meaning and fulfillment, and what does not. Some of these theorists often focus only on one specific aspect, such as what exactly makes a location inviting to sit at, or what kinds of environmental factors lead people to feel unsafe in a location. Beyond this, some have suggested sweeping theory to explain how people may find meaning virtually everywhere—if perhaps a certain format of design is followed. In this work, I present the latter, a broad theory.

I have mentioned a few authors thus far. When reading their works and that of many others, it occurred to me that very few of them were coming to any solid agreement about the creation of meaning, particularly “positive” meaning (which many of them gauge as environments absent of fear, easily accessible, welcoming and nurturing to all people, etc.). Often they seemed to dance together around like problems (crowded, banal urban cores, and “placeless” suburban sprawl, to name the dominant ones) and to point fingers in similar directions at possible solutions, yet, disparate, they have remained in turmoil with one another. Usually they have seemed

very sure of themselves – of what they *do not* like and the environmental typologies that they and others *do* like. Unfortunately, caught up in the visions of their wonderment at what they favor and of what they see that others favor, they have failed to look into the common roots of their typologies, and to see the influence of capitalism upon these, their ideals. I chose to use *The Image of the City* as my central text in this theoretical discussion as Lynch’s ideas seem to reach into that fundamental ground more than others.

In the end, after breathing in and mentally processing the literature of theory from these design fields, I began looking into fields outside of planning and architecture only to find that much of what I had concluded from our own literature, others outside had also deduced, though they had not necessarily applied or studied it in relation to “place” design. One of the primary conclusion of this text, that meaning is derived from the perception of unique differentiation, has been postulated and researched for approximately the past thirty years by attachment theorists in the field of psychology.

As mentioned in the Preface and at the start of this introduction, this work takes a considerably anti-capitalist, anarchist perspective. Many, if not nearly all planning theorists work solely within the realms of seeking to mitigate against capitalism while helping to perpetuate it. Some though do believe that planners can and should function in a world without ownership. Capitalism and its related authoritarian powers are based on ownership, and oppositely anarchism is based on the absence of ownership. This text seeks to conceptualize and present from these perspectives, as if the world were in this state of utopian anarchy or moving toward it. Understandably, this is an unusual stance to take since so many others look through the lens of capitalism regarding urban planning and design theory, but, to understand the situation in new, hopefully more clear ways, one must sometimes keep stepping back from the existing paradigms, and in this case, til finding oneself looking from outside the authoritarian/capitalist bubble. Arguably, the results of this perspective provide new insights about how “place” functions.

For the presentation of this analysis, this text begins with a review of the current literature, followed by the central chapter of analysis and interpretation of *The Image of the City*, ending with sections postulating applications and future research, and then concludes with a brief chapter touching on hopes and possibilities for the future.

So as to more clearly understand current planning and design theory, in the literature review are introduced some basic ideas about how both ownership and anarchist systems may function. In the context of that overview, is next a review of the current fiery debates about postmodern planning theory, followed by a review of the current most-common conceptions about the definition of the word “place” and out of this is sought the birth of a reasonably clear definition of “place” to work with throughout the remainder of this book. Then the reader is walked through a survey of planning theory from the Industrial Revolution to the present. This gives a hopefully clearer understanding of the crisis in planning and design theory today, so as to present a reasonable rationale for using the writings of Lynch as a foundation for deducing new possible base theory for planning and architecture. To conclude the chapter is a review of some basic concepts of Attachment Theory from the field of Psychology and how they apply to planning and design, so as to better understand the Lynchian design theories presented in the chapter to follow it. To summarize the

main points made in this literature review: It is argued that ownership causes the social inequalities which planners try to mitigate against. Ownership constructs though are so insidiously pervasive in the realms of planning and design theory that it blinds the environmental design fields from comprehending any sort of theory beyond its confines. The result is an experience of cognitive dissonance among professionals and thus an unending thirst for new explanatory theory to guide them.

The next chapter presents the primary analysis and conclusions. What is presented is a detailed examination of the concepts within *The Image of the City*, an analysis of their foundations in logic and reason, and using this and other existing theory – how these might be utilized to extrapolate new theory for the field. Also in this chapter, additional references are occasionally brought in to help clarify why these extrapolations might be correct. As well, there are deliberations concerning what applications and research might be next in the fields of environmental design to help verify the suggestions of theory herein. Lastly, in the brief concluding chapter are, if found true by others, what such theory might mean to these fields of design, and the hope it may offer for the future. To summarize the main points of the analysis and the concluding chapter: Fundamentally, as deduced from an analysis of *The Image of the City*, outside of ownership constructs, meaning for human beings is found only in the perception of unique difference and the orientation which such differences provide them in this universe. Morality is found only in whether a perception of difference challenges or affirms one's existing orientation. And finally, in an anarchist world, these theories may help planners and designers to maximize the experience of meaningfulness in physical design.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY THEORY

As one considers formulating new theory for the fields of environmental design, one sees many dialogues occurring. But in which realm would theory development have the greatest benefit to all and what might such new theory look like? In this literature review I examine these many dialogues, and seek to understand precisely what and why people are taking these positions, and where one might go based on those stances to formulate new theory. This examination is made in the context of the belief that an anarchist existence, free of ownership, is the best hope for a world of the greatest fulfillment and meaning, and the truest morality and equality of people in which planning can and should occur.

Understanding the idea of how “ownership” functions may help one to understand planning and design theory much more fully. In this book, *ownership* is defined as the claiming of the right to exclusively control a person, place, or thing; *capitalism* is the systematic application of the ownership construct; and *authority* is the forced application of ownership. This work also takes the position that — as ownership forms the basis of all authoritarian power, it deeply affects almost every realm of planning theory. Thus, I begin with two sections introducing how ownership functions, what its general affects are, and how an anarchist world without any ownership might function. These explanations are followed by sections revealing how ownership affects postmodern theory, place-design theory, and normative land-use planning theory. The chapter ends by suggesting that new planning theories need to be formulated which will function outside of the construct of ownership and that some of Kevin Lynch’s theories may provide us with some useful stepping stones into such new realms of thought.

An Introduction to Ownership

From my examination of planning and design theory literature at present, almost all of the literature appears to revolve around the nature of ownership and its moralities. To more clearly understand what is occurring, it seems essential to present a basic overview of Marxist and anarchist conceptualizations of how power and morality occur due to ownership.

One way to perhaps conceptualize current planning and design theories is to think of them politically in a circuitous manner. See figure 1, the circle of ownership and anarchy. At the top of the diagram is the political center. As one travels to the right, private ownership and individual rights increase, while to the left, public/government ownership and authority precipitously increase. When they meet at the bottom, they cancel out each other’s ownership and the system of ownership, capitalism, ceases, and at this bottom point of anarchy is the realm in which, without any ownership, postmodernism might fully exist and where normative theory transforms into a proliferation of endless diverse differentiations. I base this diagram in part on the explanations of anarchists Donald Rooum (1992, 10) and Noam Chomsky (1995).

Upon closer examination of this sphere of beginnings, endings, and fusions, the concept of ownership is fundamental and, as will be explained, most




Fig. 1. The circle of ownership and anarchy

current field theories are based on the tension between the right and the left, and also the tension between the anarchist and non-anarchist realms. In relation to this diagram, the debates in postmodern planning theory, place/community design theory, and in normative planning and design theory are deeply affected.

Examining this breadth of debates surprisingly appears to reveal a spectrum of immense theoretical desperation in the fields of planning and design theory, primarily due to the social construction of ownership. Contemporary planning itself fits in this diagram in that, while planners are in an ownership capacity themselves, and driven by visions of a non-ownership based world of complete equality of people, they act to try to mitigate against the exploitation, alienation, and dehumanization which ownership causes, particularly that which private capitalism causes.

Manual Castells has written, “The planning idea, in its modern expression, came out from the movement of social reform aimed at mitigating the human cost of capitalist industrialization” (1982, 3). This quote reveals perhaps a great truth that planners may not always understand, that their job is about mitigating capitalism – but they may also not understand what the “human cost” of capitalism is, nor how it is caused. And not revealed by Castells here is that like the private capitalists, they too (planners), as authoritarian owners, are participating in the “human cost.” In the same article, Castells describes generally some of the human divisions and destabilizing influences of capitalism and said of the field, “Planning ... could be a truly innovative field in our epoch of crisis” (4). These are strong words, “epoch of crisis,” and, as will be argued, this *crisis* is caused by ownership.

This is imperative to understand as the job of a planner today as set forth in *Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company* (1926) 71 L.Ed. 303 is to uphold the “health, safety, morals, and general welfare” of the people — that is, while simultaneously preserving and enhancing capital investments. So, the planner acts as a mitigator against the ills of dehumanization, exploitation and societal divisions that capitalism brings, while simultaneously helping to facilitate the spreading and strengthening of that capitalist exploitation. This is a cause of much grief and cognitive dissonance for the planner, that they are trying to do several contradictory things at once, mitigate exploitation while allowing it to occur, and in this way and

other ways they are participating in and perpetuating the exploitation and social inequalities themselves. Much current planning literature discusses this very thin line that the practicing planner walks (Innes de Neufville 1983, Lim 1986, Healey 1992, Hillier 1995, Campbell 2006, Hoch 2006), but very few appear to debate, discuss, or bring into question ownership itself, nor its children, capitalism and government (Ward 1990). Among postmodern planning theorists has appeared discussion concerning the ills of capitalism and government, but no discussion is present of how we might move toward their abandonment even toward anarchy, what that day might look like, and what theory might guide us then. This will be discussed in more detail later, but some do appear to see postmodernism as a door leading to this anarchy, but few, if any, speak of crossing that threshold. Such is a symptom of being in an ocean of ownership, drowning beneath the waves, and failing to recognize that one should swim, and even fly free.

So, where instincts are failing, to help aid in filling this great void with dialogue, and to help understand how this circle of ownership versus anarchy functions, the theories of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels during the nineteenth century and Marxist thinkers to present may additionally help one to understand planning and design theory today and the “crisis” of our times. Capitalism itself systematically allows things to be *owned* as private property. Marxist theory reveals how human exploitation and societal divisions occur as a function of capitalism, as a function of implemented ownership.

In Capitalism, everything, including human beings, is owned and thus everything carries an exchange value. These constructs of *ownership* and its facilitator, *quantified exchange*, create a shockwave affecting nearly every part of how people behave in and how they think about themselves and the world. Ownership also resultantly affects us by dividing society, alienating us into unequal economic classes, genders, ethnicities, and religions. Of these unequal divisions, planners and other environmental designers are given the task of mitigating against them. Below is explained *how* ownership causes these inequalities.

In the following quote, Marx and Engels speak of how human beings are de-humanized by boiling their existence down to a cold, heartless exchange value.

[Capitalism] has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies [of life] ... in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefensible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked shameless, direct, brutal exploitation. (Marx and Engels 1972, 475)

In capitalism, human beings become exchangeable commodities. They are bought and sold and exploited as “wage slaves” unto those who own (205). Their lives are stretched thin, working long hours for little pay, and when they return to their dwellings, they must pay other owners to dwell.

Thus, in this world of exchange, society becomes divided into classes of owners and non-owners, who, caught up in the divisive, unequal quantification of their lives, develop other perspectives on their existence which further divide them:

The possessing class and the proletariat represent one and the same human self-alienation. But the former feels satisfied and affirmed in this self-alienation, experiences the alienation as a sign *of its own power*, and possesses in it the *appearance* of a human existence. The latter, however, feels destroyed in this alienation, seeing in it its own impotence and the reality of an inhuman existence. To use Hegel's expression, this class is, within depravity, an indignation against this depravity, an indignation necessarily in this class by the contradiction between its human nature and its life situation, which is a blatant, outright and all-embracing denial of that very nature. (Marx and Engels 1972, 133)

This paragraph reveals how through the social construction of private property, the owner class and non-owner class function as opposites. The owner class certainly wants to preserve its position of owning, for it gives them a feeling of personal power, of empowerment, a feeling of really living a "human existence," as ownership lends itself to not only having control over one's own life, but being *benevolent* to the 'have nots'. Thus their *humanity*, their level of *humanness*, their morality, is based on their levels of control and their charity to non-owners. One can also very well carry this logically into the religious sphere too, of God being the owner of one's soul, and, in benevolence, having mercy on the deprived human race. The structure of owner/non-owner is everywhere.

In our current society in which Marxist and anarchist ideas are not widely studied by the population or promoted by the mass media, identifying these inequalities as ownership-based can sometimes be difficult. The non-owners (of which there are many types – to be discussed later), transfixed by the swirling, permeating ocean of media around them, appear to be largely pacified into accepting capitalism and ownership as just the way life is, and they may not be as fiercely angry about their situation these days as Marx exhibits they were in his time. Still, his points here continue to be applicable in that even if the non-owning masses have generally been pacified, whether or not they are consciously aware of it, or of how that quantification and exploitation specifically function matters not, the exploitation and dehumanization they experience is still real and still plays upon their psyche.

So except for their ownership of their own labor-power, in relation to the quote above, the alienation of being a non-propertied person can create an unconscious cognitive dissonance. For without owned property, a very real inequality exists between having capital/ownership on the one side, and being a non-owning wage-slave unto those with ownership-control. It is a form of slavery, a wage-based slavery. As a slave, being on unequal ground with the owners, logically one could feel that they are in a state that denies their validity as human lives and their equality. This is a "depravity," a gross perversion of equality of people (133). When we very briefly now relate this all to the circle of ownership and anarchy (see figure 1), we see some other varieties of inequality occurring—government ownership.

In the diagram, the government is an owner of how property is used and how people behave. Government, politicians, planners, etc. are owners by way of the police power, the power of the sword – but they are also touted as having benevolence unto the have nots. Simultaneously, on the other side of the diagram are the private property owners holding their guns to defend their property, but also having mercy and charity unto the have nots. In this case, charity itself could not occur unless ownership first occurs. The "good" occurs because of the unequal evil.

Other inequalities as well, based on “love” and “charity,” sprout from the construct of ownership. Such ownership-based ideals have wrought approaches, reactions, and cures that further divide society, especially in the fields of planning and design. To better explain these resulting, additional inequalities, the attachment theorist Peter Marris (notably also a planning policy analyst, but apparently not an anti-capitalist or anarchist (2001, 2004, 81-83)) has spoken of this:

“We have ... created a society that is embarrassed and uncomprehending of grief and doubtful of bonds of love; neither grief nor love are compatible with the mechanism of its science or the utilitarianism of its policy. Yet at the same time this rationalism provokes in reaction an idealization of love and mothering that endows them with almost sacred qualities. ... [Thus] bourgeois industrial society idealized and romanticized the home as a world apart, where women gave unbounded love to their children and their men, redeeming the emptiness of making money.” (1982, 185-6,188)

Here seen, there are certain experiences of human beings that seemingly cannot occur within the capitalist realm (as they function without expectation of exchange), and so they are exalted in the embodiments of religious beliefs, gender roles, and ideals of community and home. We see this in planning and design in the form of the crazed, holy veneration of a “sense of place” or a “sense of community” — idealizations about home, family, and community, all being places of “unbounded love” (Cresswell 2004, Rose 1993, 55). In contrast to these feminine ideals, the masculine has come to represent all that is capitalism: *ownership*, authority, cold hearted exchange, domination, and exploitation. Thus by way of capitalism is created the idealized conceptions of the gender binary (Strathern 1985, 194-195, Chambers 2005, 333, 336, Skeggs 2005, 969). In the circle of ownership and anarchy, when one enters anarchy there is no more authority of the sword and no ownership of things to benevolently give, because nothing is owned. Everything just is. And the holiness of place and community are even used as a justification for continued exploitation (Marris 1982, 186) — to do or preserve this great good, we must continue to engage in just a little bad. Politically on the right, we must uphold the sanctity of women, of home and family, of mother-love as they epitomize everything that capitalism is not — and we will not allow anything else but this holy gender binary and family structure (186). And on the political left, we must uphold the embrace of place, the feeling of womb-like community, and by the power of the sword we will destroy and displace existing places and communities and regulate ad finitum to help bring about this great, unbounded good. When ownership and its companion charity enter the picture, they leave a torrent of displacement and alienation in their wake. Capitalist constructions have many other repercussions too.

“Competitive capitalism promotes an ideal of minimal commitment.” (Marris 2004, 78) There are many contemporary tales of cities competing for a large company to move into their jurisdiction. They make every concession possible by waiving all sorts of restrictive laws, and even condemning land and giving it to a company almost for free to draw them in (78-79). People too. Disposable and easily exchangeable, they are at the mercy of the capitalists, the owners. This kind of environment can be rather high stress, because levels of commitment are so low, and thus uncertainty so high. There is little if any security or stability because such low commitment levels facilitate easier exchange of owned things (79-80). And so as

capitalism's uncertainty permeates society, it leads people to seek that which they can perceive as stable: Idealizations about home, family, gender, femininity, mother-love, spirituality – all slyly based on capitalism (80-81, 1982). Deceptively driven to these by the lack of commitment elsewhere, they act as a body of values that oppositely carries *the ultimate* in commitment; and thus their embodiments are glorified (Rose 1993, 55). To experience long-term commitment, many may choose to not only affiliate strongly with these idealized embodiments of gender and home/work divisions, but also with other things that seem stable, a socio-economic class, an ethnic group, a religious order, or other social body. This further divides society. (Marris 2004, 80)

And so we see in this brief summary of how ownership functions, how capitalism (the systematic application of ownership) has divided society and how it generally affects certain aspects of planning and design theory. In quantifying *everything* to make it all exchangeable, human beings are boiled down to a cold dollar value. This divides society the further: Owners, slaves unto them. Human, inhuman. Righteous, depraved. Sacred, exchangeable. Irrational, rational. And thus the idealization of home, of community, of femininity, becomes a righteous justification for “shameless ... exploitation” (Marx and Engels 1972, 475). Commitment and stability vs. capitalist uncertainty — driving in feminine, masculine, black, white, Muslim, Christian, American, North Korean, righteous, perverse. One can see how capitalism not only divides, but drives an ever deepening cycle of division.

The implications of these divisions are vast. As this chapter progresses, it will be explained in much more detail how various aspects of planning and design theories are connected to this understanding of ownership and oppression and then how we might escape it.

Anarchy

Before entering a discussion of postmodern theory, to more fully understand a realm where postmodernism might exist, I believe it would be helpful to convey a greater understanding of what anarchy is as talked about in the circular spectrum of ownership and anarchy, and to speak briefly, as well, about the current approaches toward creating that anarchist world and then to round into how postmodernism may be reflected in that pursuit.

Understanding anarchy

As mentioned, when one enters this point on the circle, in this realm of anarchy there is no ownership and no authority (Rooum 1992, Chomsky 1995). Thus, anarchy as defined in this book is not about a lack of order, but about a lack of authority. Anarchy is the absence of ownership. Authority is the forced application of ownership. Some might define anarchy as an absence of authority and thus a condition of “every man for themselves,” a lawless world in which the gun or sword of every person rules. Clearly in this definition there is still a form of ruling/ownership, individuals ruling over other individuals by the power of the sword, killing anyone who would stand in their way toward their personal liberation. This may seem closer to capitalist libertarianism than anarchy, but this may be how

some define it and approach it (Merriam-Webster 1991, 83). This text though defines anarchy simply as there being no owners, rulers, or other authorities, individually or in governmental forms; a stateless society, ruled neither by individuals nor by a group (Black 2004, 6). As well, in this anarchy, there may be “authorities,” of a sort, who possess great knowledge of a certain topic, such as about how to design a structure so that it will not fall down in an earthquake, but there are no authorities who, in acts of ownership, will fine you or send you to jail for not building a structure a certain way. There are no authorities to heap guilt or shame upon you or to limit your thinking, because even if someone bears a lot of knowledge, there is no one to say for sure that they are right. People are empowered to listen and interpret the world however they will. Authority based on ownership, whether that ownership is claimed by the power of the sword or brainwashing words that manipulate with non-physical guilt and fear, it is the same.

For the planner in a position of authority, they may speak of right and wrong, but in anarchy their words may only be taken as knowledgeable possibilities. And without ownership, there would be no capitalism to mitigate against, only infinite possibilities. But why is authority so important to some then? It keeps certain people in power. The government authorities and the capitalists with the police and military, at their disposal, they are the kings. They own and rule their ownership by the power of the sword. If there were no ownership or authority, a great many people might be most happy with this. And one may absolutely have peace, order and cooperation in an anarchist world. But, some might say, would not violence break forth, would not the buildings fall down, and the streets, they might not end up being straight?!

In an anarchist world, if someone behaves “badly,” is that so wrong? No one can actually say that they are “bad” or “ill-of-mind” as no one is an authority. As well, the idea of any sort of designations of gender or race or whatever would be absent except perhaps if you told people what your self-defined designation is, and even then if they call you something different, you really cannot get mad at them, because you do not own them (have no authority over them) nor do they over you.

Well, what if someone steals *your* food, pollutes *your* river, or brings harm to *your* child? The following examples exhibit how no thing is owned. They actually cannot steal or do harm to your things because you do not really own them. They do not really belong to you. They just are. They just exist.

In this world without ownership, you might live in a house or in a community. Say some stranger to you walks into the house, sits down and takes a nap on the couch. Perhaps later they wake up and go to the kitchen and consume some food. Perhaps you tend a large garden in the yard. This stranger goes into the backyard and plucks some carrots out of the ground and consumes them. You do not own the carrots, the food in the kitchen, couch, or the house. You are no authority and they are not either. Nobody is. You have the freedom to settle in one spot, or to live like the bird.

In such a setting, naturally one would think that some would want to take advantage of the “system.” If one were to suddenly pick up a sword, literally or in manipulatory words of guilt or shame, then the anarchy ceases to be. Is such a world possible? Will it come in our lifetimes? Maybe, but maybe not. This work argues that, very much, it is possible, and even necessary to be pursued. This next example gives one a good picture of how anarchy is both libertarian in the right to live and be

however one feels, yet also how it is an endeavor of thinking people who collectively choose to live without ownership of anything, including other human beings.

Suppose you live along a river that you get water from to drink and water crops. Suppose someone dumps a pollutant in that river that poisons you and others who live along it. If the river was poisoned deliberately, one person is claiming ownership over the lives of every person and many other life-forms along the water's course, and in such a case they have broken the anarchy. In the path toward an anarchist world, one would certainly want to stop such pollution, but through exercising the least amount of ownership possible or no ownership at all. In anarchy, if the act was not deliberate but merely someone not understanding this larger infringement on others' right to live, then people would work collectively to solve the problem, and upon finding the polluter when learning of the devastation which they are causing that person or group, they would immediately and consciously cease that behavior and find an alternative which would not endanger the lives of others. Clearly seen here are the libertarian and socialist sides of an anarchist world in action. The next example is more personal concerning ownership over your tribe or collective and the alienation occurring out of such behavior.

Say that there is a child who you have birthed and/or reared. In defense of that child who, let us suppose, is being verbally or physically abused by an adult, as soon as you raise a hand or pick up a weapon to bring injury to that abuser, you are claiming ownership over both that person and your child. You own the venerated body of your child (as you have exalted hir), and you obviously own the life of the one you kill for verbally or physically assaulting or molesting that child. Reciprocally, the abuser claims ownership of, and exploits, the mind and/or body of that child. I do not advocate exploitation of any kind, but with every step taken into capitalism – the world of ownership – the more you alienate your child from you through your authoritarian exaltation and sanctification of hir, and the more you alienate yourself from all other beings through your *righteous* ownership of them by the power of the sword.

Stealing would not exist in anarchy because no one owns anything, except perhaps themselves. Abuse would not exist in anarchy because it is a form of a person having authority over another through their ownership and exploitation of that person. In our current authoritarian world – on the path to anarchy, if someone were to poison a river or abuse a child, of course one would immediately want to end this particular instance of authority (the poisoner, or the abuser) and help them understand what they have done, but do so by using the very least amount of authority possible or none at all (Meyers 2000, 15). The more that people feed the beast of authority and control, the more it persists.

Community and cooperation take on completely new meanings in anarchy. In the ownership society, tending to take on meanings *opposite* of capitalism, “community” embodies a world of giving what is owned without expectation of return. In anarchy, everything just is. You are merely passing something to another, it is nothing that you own. And regarding cooperation, no one is obligated to do anything, but you *can* agree with others to accomplish tasks, and especially without the fear of chastisement or punishment if you fail (*Anti-Mass: Methods of Organization for Collectives*, Meyers 2000).

Would everyone steal in an anarchist society? It would no longer be

stealing. And the people would reciprocally want to mold the physical world, its buildings and landscape to be as easy and giving of sustenance as possible. As nothing is owned, knowledge is not either. Would organizations cease? Certainly not. We can agree to keep them going, but if we see that the organization is unproductive or unchanging to our needs and wants, then we have the freedom to leave it and do something else, form something else. As there is not money, nor ownership and authority, there is nothing to bind us economically. We are free. When we are a part of something, it is because we feel it important to be, or that it is a productive and fulfilling aspect of our lives.

In this anarchy, the only way that the anarchy can continue in peace is if there is consensus regarding the anarchy. If ownership and resultantly capitalism step into the picture in the least, it ceases to be. Certainly we can be sedentary caretakers, but we can also live like the bird. Anarchy requires a major shift in how people think about and conceive of the world. Yes, some may argue that it is just too big a shift for human beings to make. Capitalism is a construction that humans have created. I do not believe it is too huge, and as huge as it may be, that does not mean I nor anyone else cannot work to try to conceptualize what that day might be like and work for it to happen. And thus this text.

Some anarchists do believe that visceral violence may have to be taken to overthrow the systems of authority that exist (Bonanno 1977). Yes, once one has killed all of the owners, a form of anarchy may be, but if people have not learned how ownership functions to oppress and destroy them — they may be likely to quickly revert to that old system of which they are so familiar (*You Can't Blow Up a Social Relationship: The Anarchist Case Against Terrorism* 1998). Unbounded knowledge and thinking frees human beings. And as might be concluded, *not* having authority, ownership and thus capitalism, such are rules that a civilization might agree to have. The anarchy has “rules,” but they are rules that are not based on fear or the forced controlling of and oppression of others, but on agreeing to have lives of real, true equality and freedom for all.

Personal approaches to anarchy

To create this world, as one might conclude from the circle, there have evolved two predominant bodies of anarchists: individualist/lifestyle anarchists and social anarchists (Bookchin 1995). This is not to say that there are other varieties of anarchists or those that choose not to be labeled at all (Black 2004), but these two groups are the most primary. Both of these groups could be discussed extensively, but to summarize their perspectives, both base their views on the ownership system being the core of all human inequalities and of many human psychological dysfunctions.

The first group, lifestyle anarchists, focus on the libertarian side of anarchist thought. Most often they critique how people are disconnected from the means of production and they respond through libertarian acts of independence to subvert that system. Their critique actively expresses that people live their lives in capitalism not seeing how and where owned, material goods are coming from, nor do people immediately, if ever, see the consequences of their purchase locally and globally, all while living a life where their desire for most things is artificially created to prompt their continued purchasing to own and use those created goods. In

mind numbing amounts, massive numbers of the exact same thing are produced to quench these created needs. Lifestyle anarchists oftentimes also critique technology itself as helping to fuel that mass purchasing of goods, the resultant psychological disconnections for people, and even the destruction of the planet. (Cross-Nickerson 2007, Prieur 2005, Debord 1973) Some anarchists involved in the critique of technology even consider themselves primitivists, and seek to promote and live their lives as hunter and gatherers (RedWolfReturns 2004, Feral Forager). For the lifestyle anarchist generally, with the world around them being so industrially repetitious and distantly controlled and produced by titanicly larger capitalist forces, amid these immense personal disconnections, it can be very disconcerting to people to the point of driving many to want to break from it through an embrace of a more libertarian, independent life, in which one's personal self-reliance and self-determined uniqueness is most valued. And thus the unique individuality and independence of personal expression often associated with lifestyle anarchism. Among this group, as well, there are some who have sought perspectives of postmodernism in which immense diversity is celebrated, thus seeking to break apart and destroy the repeated standardizations, idealizations, compounded personal disconnections, and even the oppressive technologies associated with the ownership system. Some, experiencing a sense of powerlessness in the face of the ownership machine, embrace nihilism, in which they conclude that anything they do is useless, except perhaps taking up arms and to sabotage the deranged capitalist machine (A! 2004, An Anonymous Nihilist 2004, Bookchin 1995, Bonanno 1977). All of these perspectives, related predominantly to discontent over such large scale disconnection, encompass the libertarian side of anarchy.

The second group, social anarchists, often most value a critique of how inequalities occur among people due to capitalism. Many of these critiques were discussed in the preceding section so they will not be expounded on much further here, but the social anarchist's personal response to that critique in the form of action, many times unlike the lifestyle anarchist, comes as an effort to educate and organize people, forming labor unions, intentional communities, and other forms of collectives of people – to the point of eventually collectively abandoning or destroying that system of inequality which ownership causes (Bookchin 1995). Collectives of people agreeing to work together in consensus toward common goals aids in dissolving the system by helping to create environments where people are politically equal in their power and where ownership scarcely or does not exist, only the values that people freely agree about. Other activities they engage in are to create other types of environments where ownership does not exist, such as creating and advocating permaculture (landscaping the environment so that all plants are edible, bear an edible fruit, or are useful in some other manner), using natural, local building materials in construction (such as cob or strawbales), encouraging the use of open source software, contributing to or advocating non-commercial radio, pirate radio, or other independent media, feeding the homeless, or simply leaving things one does not need on the street for others to freely take. Many, if not all of these acts are also lifestyle anarchist endeavors as such actions help destroy global exploitation and power structures by connecting people with local means of production. Some social anarchists may also be very active in the political left, simply as a way to help spread knowledge and discontent among the democratic/socialist left. This is the socialist side of anarchism, to critique social inequalities and act to end them

primarily through collective action.

The dialogue above is not to say that collectives do not occur among lifestyle anarchists or that the critiques of lifestyle and social anarchists do not overlap. They absolutely do, but some people value one avenue of critique over the other. The current literature suggests that, most anarchists very much appear to carry philosophic characteristics of both, yet altogether carry the same goal, the destruction of the ownership state:

It doesn't matter if I, for instance, may have gotten more out of situationism than syndicalism, whereas another anarchist has gotten more out of feminism or Marxism or Islam. Where we have visited and even where we come from is less important than where we are and where ... we are going.... (Black 2004, 6)

From the quote above, situationism is an individualist anarchist perspective, syndicalism and Marxism dwell among social anarchist perspectives, feminism and Islam carry some aspects of both. The unity of anarchists toward a stateless society, owned and ruled neither by individuals nor by a group is the common goal.

With these understandings now of how ownership functions, how a world without ownership might function, and the philosophical avenues and advocacy that anarchists often take, this book will now examine the currently dominant theories in the fields of planning and environmental design and examine the forms of their severe theoretical desperation as they relate to ownership.

As one considers urban planners and designers, they are seen by some as seekers of anarchist consensus and equality, but while diametrically trying to find in that the balance between individual ownership and public ownership. The dialogues of postmodernism in the field appear to be sabotaging that precarious balance.

Postmodernism

Postmodernism is a concept which has garnered much debate over the past two decades, especially, in this case, within the field of planning. Very simply, postmodernism as interpreted from the planning literature is an abandonment of the modernist idea that there is only one *ideal* way of perceiving or doing anything; the implications of this abandonment are reciprocally the questioning and abandonment of authority ordering forth those ideal ways; additionally, it is not only the embrace of the possibility that there is more than one way—it becomes even the celebration of diversity (Allmendinger 2001). Anarchy, like this postmodernism, in many ways also seeks to be inclusive of diversity, though anarchy is more of a political idea than an ontology. Anarchy itself embodies the abandonment of authority, of any one person or body ordering forth one right or *ideal* way (Rooum 1992). The overlap and the pursuit of postmodern philosophy by many anarchists clearly opens to view a destination in which postmodern planning and physical design might very well exist. A questionable side of postmodernism is that it can tend (depending on one's personal interpretation of what postmodernism is) to deconstruct *all* ideal ways, including anarchy itself, and as such, many anarchists have simply grabbed hold of that which is useful to anarchism (the questioning of authority) and let go of the interpretation of postmodernism's total disassembling aspect that can lead on to

nihilism (Bornstein 2006), though some anarchists have appeared to have embraced a form of postmodern-nihilism (Black 2004, An Anonymous Nihilist 2004). In urban planning circles, many theorists also appear to see the empty meaninglessness of nihilism as the final result of a postmodern analysis of planning, and in their apparent dire paranoia of this, to better cope, they might glean some helpful hints from various anarchist perspectives and, likewise, take what they need and move on.

When we look at the planning practice on the circle of ownership and anarchy, it tends to dwell on the left, the planners being owners as they own how the city is to be designed. They may have many “egalitarian” ideals of equality that could only truly exist in an extreme libertarian-socialist world, but find themselves mired in the unbalanced soup of ownership. As postmodernism may in many ways be a path to an anarchy, and as they have not fully explored how cities might be designed in such anarchy, many find themselves in terror at the thought of planning being reconstructed in the light of postmodern thought. Many planning theorists veritably see it as the end of planning itself (Stein and Harper 1995, 2003, Saarikoski 2002, Campbell 2006) but there is the clear possibility, however frightened they might be, that it is not the end.

In the debate over postmodern planning theory, several camps of thought have established themselves. Oren Yiftachel (1999) has suggested that when planning theorists address postmodernism, they tend to break into two groups, the first he says take “a critical approach” by deconstructing how planners obtain and use the *authority* they have (267). Yiftachel also explains that many of these theorists also have used the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault as a basis for their arguments and that their critical examinations can and have had the effect of revealing the exploitive nature and injustices of current planning practices, sometimes referred to as its “darker side” (268, Flyvbjerg 1996) which is due to the social construction of ownership as already discussed. Particularly Flyvbjerg’s book *Rationality and Power* (1998) has set off a firestorm of postmodern debate in planning theory circles. Still, very strangely, not even the most provocative postmodern planning theorists such as Flyvbjerg or Yiftachel have dared suggest anarchy, but strangely have only suggested that the field needs major capitalist-based reforms (Flyvbjerg 2001, Yiftachel 1999). Understanding the circle of ownership and anarchy, one can see how planning in a world of ownership can never truly be moral in an equality-based way. The other camp Yiftachel speaks of, focuses not so much on understanding planning power, but instead on how to use it in a “moral” way, how to best use the kind benevolence associated with authoritative ownership. He calls their tack a “communicative-pragmatist approach” (267). This group will often use seemingly feel-good concepts such as “egalitarianism” and “sustainability,” which like concepts of “place” and “community” among design theorists are thrown around as high-minded words but without precise definitions. Such vague terms help them justify their exploitive yet benevolent, ownership-based professions (Gunder 2006, 212). This second group, as well, appears to be somewhat split in two: those who are generally in a crisis mode, terrified of the possibility that postmodern theory is a threat to the entire planning profession as it exposes the injustice of their contribution to the ownership-based world (Stein and Harper 1995, 2003, Saarikoski 2002, Campbell 2006) and those who merely brush postmodernism off as rather inconsequential, and instead they tragically advocate traditional, ownership-based reforms (Chakravorty 1999, Marris 2004, Gunder 2004,

2006). Among all of these theorists though, those taking “a critical approach” and those assuming a “communicative-pragmatist approach,” neither appear to see the postmodern critique as being not just about *their* power but about *all* power, and they fail to see that that power rests singularly in the concept of ownership. They see it as a personal attack, when it is not. It is an attack on all forms of power.

Many who take the “communicative-pragmatist approach” become enormously defensive at the sight of a postmodern critique. “Planning should not be dismissed” says Gunder (2004, 309). “[Postmodernism] threatens to paralyze liberal and emancipatory planning efforts” worries Saarikoski (2002, 12). “[In postmodernism,] we cannot make any distinctions; we cannot make any judgments; we cannot make any plans; in fact, we cannot say or do anything. [This] seems totally inconsistent with the goals of planning—regardless of how planning is defined!” (Stein and Thomas 2003, 132). In their circle of perceptions, or lack thereof, the idea of losing their positions of authority, of ownership is quite an uncomfortable thought for them.

And of those in this, evidently, panic mode, amid their alarm at the possibility of losing their forms of ownership, they are resorting to a fervent call for benevolent morality and honesty among planners.

A theoretical privileging of the vocabulary of power could blind us to other realities, by reinterpreting everything within a reductionistic metanarrative of power and power structures. A practical focus on power could breed despair and suspicion, undermining trust. We will argue that equal attention should be given to the vocabulary of trust, which is more useful for legitimate conflict resolution and consensus building in public planning. (Stein and Thomas 2003, 126)

Such words as “could breed despair” and “undermine trust” reflect a call to steer clear of questioning how planners get and use their power and what its cruel consequences are. But in spite of their efforts to foster “trust” this will not eliminate ownership, but be just a superficial band-aid to hide the cancer within. Clearly their “conflict resolution and consensus” are to help falsely mitigate against the pernicious capitalism, not to leap free of it. Also, it is clear from the statement that if postmodernism deconstructs their field, they are assuming it would *not* deconstruct ownership elsewhere. This is simply not true. As soon as power/ownership is questioned in one place, it must be questioned everywhere.

In another article by Stein and Thomas, they more poignantly reveal their dire lack of core understanding of how the postmodern deconstruction is about understanding ownership power (be it public *or* private):

Life in an industrial or postindustrial society does often seem to lack a center. But the separation, alienation, and isolation experienced is seen, not as the result of any philosophical thesis (like the liberal conception of the autonomous self), but of certain distortions in our society (e.g., the modernist emphasis on technology, scientific objectivization of people, overspecialization of labor, reification of market value). There is no conceptual reason for a lack of center, it is not entailed in giving up foundationalism. The last thing we need is a postmodernist theory which needlessly exacerbates this alienation. (1995, 240-241)

They appear to think that any critique of power would only make the exploitive,

alienating system worse. For them, they seem to understand the alienation and dehumanization that capitalist private ownership causes, but they do not see themselves, as a public, governing body, as being owners themselves.

And so when the truth be told about the “dark side” of planning, not seeing the critique to include all other forms of ownership too, they shudder at the thought.

“Anything goes” only serves the interests of the already dominant, not the weak or the poor, and it is surely the needs of the latter that must be in the foreground of a just planning activity. (Campbell 2006, 103)

In response to the postmodern critique, Campbell, like Stein and Thomas, assumes that the critique is only concerning the planning profession and of government, that it is an attack on the generous intents of the profession to lift up the poor and the needy. There is no understanding presented that in a postmodern world, capitalist ownership would surely go as well. Campbell persists:

...planning is concerned both with liberty and with moral rights; the problem comes when a structure of libertarian rights and obligations is devised to deal with moral rights concerning goods and services (and vice versa). (96)

There is the perception here that planning surely cannot be a divisive and alienating force in the larger society, but that it is a morally stabilizing force, which keeps the rights of people from swinging out of control—particularly the right of ownership control.

Others too seem to recognize a possible postmodern anarchy, but they do not seem to perceive it as a threat. Goodchild (1990) argued that anarchy itself as a method of implementing postmodern thought is far too counter to the rational, regulatory nature that planning often represents and thus it is not a real threat. Alexander Ernest openly dismissed the anarchist critique of government as being unimportant, arguing that planning can be “intrinsically value-free [and thus it] neutralizes all its ideological critics” (2004), which seems quite a flawed perspective in the light of Flyvbjerg’s analysis of the “dark side” of planning (1996, 1998). It seems that, for whatever reason, they view a society without ownership as unrealistic or invalid.

And more generally too, the belief continues to persist that a climate of “egalitarian” inclusiveness should be sought through policies of mitigation against capitalist exploitation and divisiveness (Gil 1992, Chakravorty 1999). Truly such planners want to grant freedom from oppression, but appear to have difficulty taking their discussions to the lengths of Marxist and anarchist liberation.

And, in the literature, as both those taking “a critical approach” and those taking a “communicative-pragmatist approach” seem unable to abandon the idea of pursuing ownership-based reforms, clearly there is not just a crisis among some, but either a lack of courage or a lack of understanding capitalism itself among a great many. Planners and planning theorists may speak of a want to embrace postmodern openness, but not recognizing that the ownership system – capitalism, and modernism functioning together have been and continue to be of immense influence on them. And not recognizing these influences, but taking the critique as a personal threat, has also been one of their greatest theoretical setbacks to evolution.

Place/Community Design Theory

Also at present, the fields of urban design and architecture have not gone unaffected by capitalism's domination. The romantic idealization of the words "community" and "place" are used incessantly in the fields of architecture, urban design, and planning. As was explained, the idealization of these buzzwords rests in the existence of an ownership society. Below I exhibit the current romanticized conception of "place" as related to the opening sections, but first suggest a definition of "place" to use throughout the rest of this book.

For this text, I define the word "place" simply as *the perception of one or more unique differentiations*. Below, I put forth a brief basis for this rather unadorned definition, based in part on the explanations of Tim Cresswell in his book *Place: A Short Introduction* (2004). This definition is also based on the writings within *The Image of the City*, but as "place" is one of the key subjects of the main analysis chapter, and as Cresswell's text is a very good summary of the existing literature and theorists regarding "place" theory, I shall use Cresswell below.

In his book, Cresswell, does not provide any clear definitions of "place," per se (few do), but he does provide several contemporary conceptualizations of it. By looking at them, it can help one to understand "place" more clearly. These explanations are given primarily from out of the field of Geography, which, as Cresswell describes it, "is the study of places" (1). Let us examine some of these conceptualizations from chapter 2 of his book.

In this chapter, he explains that there are four camps of understanding and research in the field of Geography. The first is that of regional geographers who seek to understand and describe the details of "discrete areas of land," including their boundaries, locations, meanings, practices and politics (50). Essentially they ask – what is in a location? The next group are "structuration" theorists who also seek to understand the unique attributes of a location, but understand them as being part of larger processes, such as amid the flows of goods, people, and information (35). This group is related to the next group – radical geographers, who, as well, seek to understand the unique details of a location, but as they correlate to social structures of power, domination, and exploitation — as discussed earlier. (50) One can use these first three groups of geographers, to help deduce a definition of place. From them it seems logical to conclude that if Geography is the study of "place" and if what they study are the unique differentiations at a location and how that location relates to other locations, then Geography is in a very rudimentary way the study of environmental differentiations, and "place" is the perception of unique differentiation in a physical location. That is how you know that you are in a specific place, because you sense its defining, unique characteristics, whether those perceptions are physical or something else. Thus the definition I posit above. Cresswell continues by speaking of a group of geographers obsessed with the romantic idealizations which capitalism causes, though from a reading of Cresswell and others they appear unaware of the possibility that capitalism, or ownership, is the cause of their romantic obsessions.

This final group spoken of by Cresswell are called humanistic geographers. Some of the most notable are Yi-Fu Tuan, David Seamon, Anne Buttimer, Edward Relph, Martin Heidegger, and Gaston Bachelard (20-24). They seek specifically to understand, almost exclusively, locations in which people dwell and work, but

especially dwell. This fixation on dwellings appears to be due to a central desire to discover how the core constituents of the *most meaningful* locations function as such. Mesmerized by a vision of certain romantic, caring, “feminine” qualities of “home” (as mentioned earlier, giving without expectation of exchange) they have come to believe that the qualities of “home” are the core factors in the determination of human meaning (50-51). And so “home” being the pedestal holding the greatest human meaning, it is considered the “ultimate” place (Rose 1993, 55). It is “almost mystically venerated” by them (56), but it is a false, dogmatic veneration that even Cresswell, a humanistic geographer himself, says cannot stand up to “critical reflection” (11). But as with any religion, who am I to question one’s personal mystical beliefs? — it is very important to, as many, deceived by the fog of capitalism, have fallen for this humanistic trap, or similar ones.

One can hopefully see clearly the influence of capitalism here. Completely missing the ruthless disease in society, some have reacted by embracing the “ultimate” idealized and romanticized embodiments of its, some might say, “moral opposite”—the giving without expectation of exchange. As I will show in the next section, ownership and the idealization of community, femininity, home, and place have also been of exceptional influence in the field of normative planning theory.

Normative Land-use Planning and Design

Beyond trying to understand planning and design theory from a Marxist and anarchist based perspective, most particularly postmodern theory and “place” design theory, capitalism as associated with the Industrial Revolution also seems as a reasonably influential, and contextually recent chronological lens from which to view how a great many people, contemporarily, design and create physical environments. This revolution was influenced by epistemological thinkers from Galileo through the Enlightenment who blossomed the idea that there could be a systematically provable, *ideal* way (a scientifically based way) to create and do anything. Galileo is credited with being the father of scientific methods and thinking, believing that people should rely on observing the world and then drawing conclusions, without the use of supernatural beliefs to explain things. He also ripened the practice of setting up experiments, observing the events and their results, and then making a record of those events and results. Later philosophers of the Enlightenment reasoned “the idea that science and reason could lead humanity toward perfection.” (Bernard 2000, 14, Soja 1997, 239)

Movements in all realms of society have now evolved to try to capture that ideal; avenues such as business, politics, medicine, and city planning became “sciences”. I put the word *sciences* into quotes because these fields and others may at times work within limited belief frameworks. They use experiment and observation, formulas and logic, but they are limited by the bounds of thought which they draw or perceive and these types and limits are drawn because of capitalism’s desire to quantify everything down to an exchange value (Landstreicher 2007, 35). For instance, in the context of New Urbanism, a recently popular limited belief framework based on quantified, interchangeable units, its proponents believe in constructing the urban environment in a system which includes only certain design forms. An easy specific example of this is that a designer following the pattern of New Urbanism would likely not consider placing a monolithic, Modernist, sheer

faced, reflective glass building in their project. It is simply not in their paradigm. Likewise, city planners and consultants in the United States who write zoning codes for cities, would not likely allow portions of a city to be constructed like that of Venice, Italy. It is not within the limits of their thinking, nor within the limits of most of their standard legal frameworks (which are based on capitalism, the ownership system of exchange, though it is true that postmodern trends do appear to offer a hope of deconstruction and rethinking). The danger of working within such limits is that it can keep one from seeing possibilities and answers which lie outside. Nevertheless, within limited frameworks of finding ideal ways, “scientists” and analysts in many fields have also sought to cope with numerous simultaneous innovations elsewhere in society.

The Industrial Revolution itself, intrinsically capitalist driven, began with two key inventions, the steam engine by James Watt in 1769, and interchangeable parts. The steam engine allowed a great increase in the speed of transporting goods and people across great distances of land and water. It also gave industries a powerful force with which to speed the manufacture of goods. The idea of interchangeable parts coupled with mass production allowed the parts of virtually anything to easily and rather inexpensively be replaced. With these innovations, production rates flew up as costs plummeted down, and profits soared. With the possibility of making much greater profits in a mill or factory, people gave up their farming and cottage industries and flocked to cities. This flight to the cities, this boom of *urbanism*, often brought on overcrowding and deplorably unsanitary conditions — forms of exploitation and dehumanization. The sciences of urban planning and architecture sought both to address the *need* for livability and beauty, and also to make cities more efficient and productive in their capitalist endeavors.

Much emphasis was placed on increasing livability through ensuring sunlight, clean water, and waste disposal for all, wherever they happened to live in the city (Platt 1996, 155-170). In fact, the human need to have these very basic amenities is now so highly valued that they are often well met in industrialized nations of today. As we shall see later, such a simplified approach of meeting the desire to survive in a relatively clean, pleasant, and uncongested industrial/urban environment can lead environmental designers, planners, and theorists to neglect more complex, even enigmatic needs. Such limited, simplified, and quantified approaches lead to standardized measures such as nominalized building setbacks, street widths, and zoning codes – ensuring in a quantified, exchangeable way that some very specific and basic needs are met, but with severely shirking volumes of others, as such laws severely limit individual liberty.

Amid such neglect, the quest to create systematically the most “ideal” designs, often effectively meeting some needs, but not all, has been a catalyst of much debate (Taylor 1998). Some of the theorists examined below are architects, some are planners, some are a little of both – all of them are involved in endeavors in the theoretical and practical construction of the built environment. To determine how “best” to meet human needs in a world of capitalist inequality, environmental design theorists before and after World War II have somewhat differed in their methodologies. Before the war, these theorists predominantly made conclusions simply by looking at the world (on any scale) and drawing inferences, their judgements often based on subjective personal ideals about what they liked or thought was good; from a philosophical standpoint, any person or group under such

a definition might be considered a Modernist (from a Postmodern perspective) or a normative theorist (versus substantive, if scientific evidence is used as a function), but from here on, this group of subjective idealists will be referred to as *Normativists* (Moudon 2000). This group has been and continues to be immensely influenced by the idealizations which are driven by capitalism and the Industrial Revolution. Certainly many theorists after the war have also worked within limited systems of theory. Still, many post-war theorists have additionally used evidence from scientific experimentation to back up their assertions; and for clarity, these I shall refer to as *Substantivists*. Certainly these too are influenced by capitalist idealizations of sterile exchange, but perhaps more so by Enlightenment rigor. Though whatever the perspective, theorists of both varieties have made important discoveries and conclusions about creating meaning and meeting needs through environmental design. And though usually not naming ownership as the true enemy—among Normativists particularly, much emphasis was and still is placed on how to mend the dehumanization that capitalism causes, by trying to make places that will lift people psychologically above that dehumanization. Unfortunately such limited, normative bounds are also themselves alienating and dehumanizing as they religiously pronounce what is exclusively “right.”

Normative theorists and designers of this pre-war era such as Pierre L’Enfant, John Nash, Georges-Eugene Haussmann, and later Daniel Burnham with his City Beautiful Movement, suggested the abandonment of designing dense cities of anfractuous streets, and instead the adoption of wide, grand boulevards focused around monumental structures, plazas, and public parks, all of which often overlaid transportationally-efficient, rectilinear, grid-like street systems. Such overlaying designs were meant to uplift, inspire, and heighten or add aspects of grandeur to the city, as well as break up very dense areas of existing cities (Platt 1996).

Ebenezer Howard, as with others of this pre-war time, Robert Owen, George Pullman, Frederick Law Olmstead, Benjamin C. Marsh, to name a few, reacted to the problems associated with capitalist driven urbanism by suggesting the design of village type communities in which people lived in single family dwellings with expanses of garden-parks separating neighborhoods and uses. Such ideals became known as the Garden-City Movement and their seeds have strongly directed suburban city design throughout the United States. As with many others, Howard believed in the idea of environmental determinism (our environment determines the kind of person we are), and that garden vistas were the best physically and psychologically for people, to help them feel good about themselves and motivated to do well in their vocations (Platt 1996).

Camillo Sitte in the late 1800s, reacted to L’Enfant and Haussmann-type grandeurous streets by suggesting that such designs and their accompanying grid-like and other geometric street layouts and building placements of this era were wrong. When concerned about getting goods and services delivered from one point to another in a city, he acknowledged that a grid system can be the most conducive to allowing a shortest path, but Sitte felt though that such patterns of city design were uncreative, and not uplifting to the human spirit. He suggested that streets be creatively twisted yet methodically laid out, and that the streets and plazas be artistically composed to have hierarchies of dominant and subdominant buildings, monuments and vistas to inspire and uplift the people of the city. He based many of his suggestions on the design of the old cities of Europe (Sitte 1965).

Similarly Le Corbusier and other Modernists near the dawn of the 20th Century reacted to capitalist urbanism and its myriad forms with a starkly different kind of reform. They felt that instead of returning to much older varieties of design and patterns, as Sitte, or fleeing to garden-city-type designs, that people should abandon all types of design they know of or have construed and work only with clean-lined, rectilinear, often mechanically repetitious, *modern* designs. Their focus predominantly centered on the creation of individual structures, framed by garden landscapes. This approach combined the deep valuing of garden-settings which Howard, Olmstead and Marsh held dear and juxtaposed it with unadorned box-like skyscrapers and expansive freeways. These Modernists felt that such simplification and juxtaposition would help people find both greater inspiration and connection to nature. (Platt 1996) Such repetitive, normative designs are indeed attempts to escape from unordered, dirty, unsanitary cities, but not to escape from interchangeable dehumanization.

All of these pre-WWII, normative approaches to environmental design hold several things in common. First, they were all trying to create a “better” built environment for people. Second, they were all predominantly reacting to the nature of urbanization and capitalism at their time. Thirdly, their reactions are each grounded in opinions – based on or evolved from not only the teachings of those before, but on the specific desires and experiences of the individual designers. One designer enjoyed the dense lyrically curved streets of Europe, others the stark contrast of clean lined buildings mid a sea of garden landscape, others lower density cottage-like cities laced everywhere with gardens. Each of these camps came to quite different conclusions about how cities and the places within them should be designed. As with so many things, these were their personal opinions. Using their personal conceptions about what they liked or thought was right.

Their forth commonality, related to following their instinctive longings, was that of trying to apply a formulaic model, format, or pattern to govern all new city design. In the shadow of the Enlightenment, such gestures of seeking a specific formula for all city design lacked application of a rigorous scientific method, but were absolutely products of modern “rational” thinking in that they each sought what they perceived as an “ideal”, “best” solution within the bounds of exchangeable typologies which were thus — “utterly arbitrary and utterly rational” (Landstreicher 2007, 35). As mentioned earlier, thinking within only one design paradigm can put limits on the design solutions one considers. If one applies only a single limited design paradigm to all situations, clearly it withholds masses of others possibilities. If one seeks to grasp the full breadth of “solutions,” one must not set limits — anarchy is limitless. Still, these theorists and designers set limits.

Their normative ideals, predominantly those of the Garden City and Modernist movements, later took the greatest hold on governing design templates within the United States from World War II to the present. Certainly also economically driven political forces have additionally forced the hand of many environmental designers throughout the United States to regulate and design cities ideally for certain capitalist driven constructions, especially for automobiles and to preserve land values (Platt 1996).

Furthermore, as U.S. judicial cases in the early 20th Century closed holes in realms of land-use regulation and economic land-value preservation, scientific research often reciprocally narrowed to work within those ownership-driven legal

structures. Indeed today, not only of course “rational” planning through regulation, but in academic design theory and even stretching into research technologies such as Geographic Information Systems (GIS), people seek to work within that unprecedented, capitalist-driven, very limited, legal, exchangeable framework — in which the “singular in beings and things disappears” (Landstreicher 2007, 35).

Also, amid the perceived magnitude of this limited lens and the climate it created for city-planners and designers to act within, *post-war* environmental design theorists have, as mentioned, predominantly broken into two camps of study: One is the Normativist group consisting of many diverse sub-groups, such as Smart Growth advocates and New Urbanists. They have generally focused more so on city-scale design, and, like many pre-war normative theorists, have used their personal likes and opinions to determine how buildings, streets, and neighborhoods might be “best” laid out. Embracing the perceived chaos and anarchy of postmodernism has been difficult for many to break into due to their captivity at the lens of modernity. The other camp, as already spoken of, is the post-war academic emergence of Substantivists. Though still influenced by various ownership constructs, they have focused more narrowly on, particularly, small-scale, locational design and employing statistics and scientific methods much more often, to scrutinize over how people interact with smaller scale design forms: With steps, doorways, benches, fountains, grass, bushes, trees, fences, columns, etc. and looking for correlations between certain features and how a location was used – for children playing, adults having lunch, for robbery, rape, or dealing drugs. Finding design correlations on these smaller scales using scientific rigor has helped to open new theoretical doors of possibilities—to better understand various specific design situations. Though presently, even as those doors of knowledge have opened through substantivism — the exchangeable, limited legal framework and the Normativists’ subjective personal taste and opinions, influenced and powered by capitalism, have remained the most forceful players in present day urban planning and design – keeping strong the planks of much “rational” planning theory and practice – though giving to *some* bowing amid the irrational multi-cultural, postmodern flood, but still holding much weight.

And in both sects of this emerging community of thinkers, like their pre-war predecessors who were reacting to capitalism and urbanization, in this post-war era they are reacting to capitalism and, particularly, the *sub-urbanization* being constructed with such haste and its accompanying dehumanizing and alienating aspects.

Two of the earliest, and most influential theorists to react were Kevin Lynch and Jane Jacobs. In 1960, Kevin Lynch released his book, *The Image of the City*. Lynch walked the line between being a Substantivist and a Normativist (Moudon 2000, 38) in that he suggested a type of template, but he was not necessarily trying to suggest the adoption of a particular city design, but appeared to sincerely be trying to understand how people perceived and interacted with the world around them. Particularly through several studies, he tried to conclusively condense the immense variety of environmental features that people perceived down to a symbolic few. His hope was that using such a universal model of perceptual understanding, designers could create features and environments that were more uniquely perceptible than the repetitive design of many suburbs he was seeing. Almost simultaneously Jane Jacobs released her scathing, seminal book, *The Death*

and *Life of Great American Cities* (1961). Jacobs was a Normativist. In his scorn for the alienating nature of suburban and modernist design, he suggested a dramatic return to the building of dense, mixed land-use cities.

It is interesting to note at this point how those of the Garden City and the Modernist movements could not mend the ills of capitalism's dehumanization and alienation. Their efforts did not see capitalism as the problem, nor did Jane Jacobs and Kevin Lynch, nor many to this day.

During the 70s, design theorists, particularly in the San Francisco Bay Area, began to explore new theory. In 1977, Christopher Alexander, et al, published the very influential book *A Pattern Language*. Alexander and his associates were Normativists and sought to reason that the romanticized, vernacular designs of mostly "old world" European cities were truly the best ways to design meaningful environments for human beings and that such ways of design were at their core, universally intuitive to all people.

In the 1970s and 1980s, several Substantivists began appearing more prominently in the literature. As Substantivists, using observational studies, they were trying to deduce what specific aspects of the human-built environment people appeared most drawn to. In 1980, William H. Whyte published his book *The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces*. Through observational studies conducted in New York City, he deduced many physical and social factors that influence whether people are attracted to an urban plaza or not. In Donald Appleyard's book *Livable Streets* (1981), he conducted several studies to do with traffic frequency on streets and at what volumes of auto traffic more people were attracted to. In the book *Fundamentals of Urban Design* (1984), by Richard Hedman, he shied away from studies and focused more on documenting patterns in built design. I would call Hedman in his book a Normativist, for he seemed to diagnose things more so based on his own perceptions, though in his approach to looking at the urban scene, he did seek to incorporate a number of systematic, substantive studies.

In 1987, Allan Jacobs and Donald Appleyard published their article "Toward a New Urban Design Manifesto" in which they exclaimed the things they thought were wrong with many current cities and sought to clarify the qualities they saw as "right." Though one quote clearly expresses their own uncertainty, "All the experience has taught me something. It may be unprovable, but I think I know what a good place is." Clearly, guided by personal experience, in this article they are Normativists, and though perhaps grounded in some substantive research, Normativists nonetheless, and unsure of themselves at that. In a later work by Allan Jacobs, *Great Streets* (1993), he reveals his continued frustration at not finding new, good place theory to guide the fields of environmental design. Jacobs, an academic finding no muse, in an act that appeared to be that of sheer desperation to explain not just "good" places but "great" places resorted to superstitiously say that they just have "magic" (9,11). This is shocking; when people use the word, "place" or "community" in nostalgic or romantic appeal the religious undertones are not as obvious, but here, when Jacobs uses the word "magic," this is a shrill and shameless surrender to mysticism. It reveals not just a variety of capitalist driven delusion, but focally, a basic lack of understanding of how meaning is precisely created and maximized. Such blatant use of mysticism is also likely a sign of his sheer desperation and a crisis among design theorists.

The late 1980s through the 1990s was a time of heated debate about

suburban development and sprouted some diverse opinion about that matter and about environmental design generally. The standard two camps, the Normativists and the Substantivists remained strong, and new and varied voices appeared in both camps during this time, but also this decade saw the rather strong rise of dialogue concerning postmodernism.

Among the Normativists, in reaction to continued suburban development, the idea of something called “smart growth” and a group called “New Urbanists” both appear to have become rather remarkably popular (Handy 1992, Ewing 1997). Though, in opposition to them sprouted some ardent advocates of suburban development (Gordon and Richardson 1997, O’Toole 1999). On the other hand, in Substantivist circles began appearing books that were large compilations of substantive studies. An editor would compile into chapters write-ups by a number of different Substantivists about their individual studies, or an author would simply condense down all the studies to tell the reader what the current research has revealed about various design topics. Examples of the summaritive or editor-complied books include *Public Streets for Public Use*, edited by Anne Vernez Moudon (1987), *Housing as if People Mattered*, by Clare Cooper Marcus and Wendy Sarkissian (1990), *Safe Cities*, by Gerda R. Wekerle and Carolyn Whitzman (1995), and *People Places*, by Clare Cooper Marcus and Carolyn Francis (1997). Postmodern thought crept into the picture, with the publication of books such as Gary Paul Nabhan and Stephen Trimble’s *The Geography of Childhood* (1994), Dolores Hayden’s *The Power of Place* (1995), and Clare Cooper Marcus’s book *House as a Mirror of Self* (1995). These postmodern books emphasized the very *individualized* experience of every person, that no two people experience the same place in precisely the same way, and not so much in Hayden’s book, but clearly in the others, they emphasize that related to this diversity of experience is the need for very diverse physical environments.

Central to most theoretical dialogues today, as in the past in the fields of environmental design, is to create locations people will find uplifting, fulfilling, and meaningful. Current theoretical and action-related dialogues appear to still circulate around approaching design projects from either a normative or a substantive perspective. Some postmodern dialogues exist, but the fields of present do not typically know how to cope with such philosophies, so most of the time such attempts end up turning into exotic varieties of normative theory – such as the New Urbanist’s Transect model (Correa 2006). And going back to the creation of meaning and fulfillment, unlike a harder science such as mathematics or chemistry, there are few, if any, rather universally accepted foundational principles to guide planners and designers except that of mercy in cold exchange. And with the philosophical addition of postmodern deconstruction potentially throwing theory into even more of a freefall, in the quest for something universal in the form of design theory to uplift and create greater meaning — contemporary desperation is high.

In articles from the early 1970s and 1980s several dialogues about this desperation emerged. Some approached the problem of cognitive dissonance in design theory and practice through the lens of a capitalist critique saying that the capitalist system should be overthrown, others addressed it from a reformer perspective, that capitalism simply needed to be adjusted.

John Friedmann (1982) explained that more radical perspectives were

sought in the 1970s, but with Reagan taking the presidency in the early 1980s, such dialogues subsided (38). In his article he prefers to not call planning as being in a crisis, but to use “softer metaphors, such as difficulty [or] trouble” (37). Taking a Marxist, but my no means anarchist, perspective, he suggests that planners should break from being “technicians of domination” (38) and through their own very local activism and the formation of urban communes, they could break down larger power structures. Under such conditions, small-scale capitalism would still exist, but “politics would be rendered superfluous”(41). As I have shown though, any kind of ownership, on global or national scales or in personal relationships, results in unjust inequality.

Somewhat oppositively, Judith Innes de Neufville (1983), taking a reformist critique, exclaimed his immense frustration at planning theory itself, that it had been and continued to be so incredibly stagnant. He expressed the cognitive dissonance practicing planners experience as they must be “rational” (as a function of capitalism), but simultaneously “ethical” (35-36) — as if the two did not go well together, and as such, “planning is in a state of crisis” (37). This article clearly shows capitalism’s wrenching effects, not only in design theory, but also in the larger realms of positivist planning theory and practice.

In an article later on by Gill-Chin Lim (1986) he also speaks of this great debate concerning planning theory itself and about the role of the planner. Lim says that many diverse perspectives had arisen, but that, “The diversity without coherence in planning theory has imbued planners with a sense of crisis: uncertain professional consciousness, role ambiguity, a lack of professional identity, and cognitive dissonance have been observed” (75). It appears that planners do not know what to do with themselves. They are caught between rational exploitive exchange and benevolent, social justice. They want to grant the world with total equality and liberation, but find themselves trying to do so while being a part of the exploitation themselves.

Contemporary Normative Desperation

As one looks at more recent dialogues about normative land-use theory, the conflict continues as planners now wrestle with the sharpened critique that includes postmodernism. And this critique continues torn in two between those who seek to be critical of the planning system and its relation to capitalism, ownership, and power structures, and those who focus upon a more reformist, communicative approach. In spite of a rather postmodern, Marxist critique being present, the influence of ownership ideologies continues to pervade.

In environmental design circles, in capitalism’s efforts to maximize exchangeability, is sacrificed the “marvelous,” “amazing” and the “surreal” (Landstreicher 2004). Arguably, to make things much more easy to exchange, we must make them all the more the same. We must have only certain “types” of housing, office, retail, and manufacturing. Even the names, “housing,” “office,” “retail,” “manufacturing,” these are four “types” also, but all such types, as extremely confining as they are, their standardization makes exchange so much easier. Categorizing things can help people communicate with each other about the world, and relatedly, a bank or other lender will be much more willing to make a loan on a development if they can readily recognize its “type.” If it does not fit

nicely in a box that can be easily exchanged, capitalism does not care for it as much. As well, it may be postulated that zoning and construction codes reinforce the limits of these nominal categories. Cities copy each other's codes. People complain that the cities are all the same, and they long for something more, while discontent often leads to neglect.

In a recent article by Ellen Dunham-Jones, "Suburban Retrofits, Demographics, and Sustainability" (2005), she explains how many suburban cities in the U.S. are experiencing abandonment and decay in their built forms and she explains some of the contemporary attempts to "retrofit" or mend the fabric of these cities. The perspective of this article is primarily normative in that the author has sought to apply an "ideal" design scheme, revealing some current theoretical values that many planners and designers hold. Their approaches include:

- "*Increase connectivity*" – breaking up superblocks, quelling auto-dependency through "integration with transit and increased walkability and bikeability." Expressed values: "environmental benefits," "healthful transportation choices and improved accessibility for nondrivers."
- "*Design around public space*" – move from creating buildings in undefined spaces to buildings that define spaces. Expressed values: "opportunities for informal public gathering and social interaction," "a strong sense of place, increase[d] walkability," "a lasting increase in economic value [and in] environmental performance."
- "*Mix uses, lot sizes, and building types*" – place "residential, commercial, retail and civic uses together." Expressed values: "reducing vehicle trips, increasing convenience, . . . allowing a sharing of resources and amenities," greater "sense of community," people of many income-levels "liv[ing] together."
- "*Add density, especially to overparked sites*" Expressed values: "improving affordability," synergistic properties. (9)

Plans in this article specifically deal with the construction of denser, mixed-use developments in the place of more typical suburban shopping centers that find themselves in decline — this example gives one a taste of an "ideal" design that is presently sought. Certainly some of the techniques here are based off of some smaller scale substantive research. Still, the assumed values here are that such a replacement development is humanly and environmentally more healthful and more socially mixed and interactive – thus seeking to mitigate against capitalism's denigrating and alienating influence.

This article includes the use of many contemporary buzzwords such as "sense of place" and "sense of community" which are, again, a romanticized reaction to capitalist dehumanization, and the idea of this being a relatively standard replacement development indicates once again that cold and calculated exchange value, of which escape is sought, still pervades the picture. "Sense of community" itself evokes something shared — when such things have great difficulty existing in a world of strict ownership and cold exchange. Though they are attempting to tap into the exalted realms of uncalculated caring, of mother-love, of home (Marris 2004), most frequently the romanticized buzzwords of "place" and "community," as in this example, are left undefined with the assumption that everyone knows what they mean, that they are without a doubt a good thing, and that this project will absolutely help to create this, that great good. Other romantic, fanciful reactions to

ownership's qualities include other vague words like "egalitarianism" (Gil 1992) "social justice" and "sustainability"(Gunder 2006, Jabareen 2006)

whose meanings are actually a mystery to all its practitioners—no one knows what they really mean, but everyone assumes that all others do. [And they are often used] as justification for their professional actions---that is, we must do this if we want a sustainable city or we must do so in the interests of social justice! (Gunder 2006, 212)

Reliance on idealized, feel-good filler words in such a form is not just a romanticized reaction to capitalism, nor simply a tool of empowerment/ownership for the planner (Gunder 2006, 212), but it is also a reflection of a relative lack of foundational theory and critical thinking, and clearly a lack of definitively recognizing *ownership* as the key problem.

Also, in a number of examples within the Dunham-Jones article, the word "charrettes" is used (2005); it is a technical word meaning an instance in which people in the city are invited to a brainstorming session with the architects and planners of the project. The author states that these charrettes lead many old zoning ordinances to be customized for various city projects (10,13). This is an indication of a failed regulatory system for designers to work within. This normative article also quotes many substantive statistics and studies about how many people are preferring to live in denser, mixed-use, urban-esque settings. As well, such a 'oversimplified dichotomy' (suburban vs. urban) is a reactionary perspective, due, once again, to capitalism and their lack of truly atomic-level, foundational design theory (Morefus 2006).

Many of the concepts in this article by Dunham-Jones could also pass as New Urbanist ideals. New Urbanists also hold as one of their sterling ideals the romanticized return to building "traditional" American neighborhoods (Duany, Plater-Zyberk, Speck 2000). And the latest acquisition to their normative list of ideals is their refined regional design conceptualization called *the transect*.

Though, even with their grand and extensive vision of the ideal city and region in their minds, like Allen Jacobs (1993) who has resorted to mysticism and Ellen Dunham-Jones (2005) who languishes as with many others in pseudo-religious buzzwords, unconsciously transfixed and driven by capitalism's permeating influence, with these other design theorists, the New Urbanists are also currently in crisis mode. In a recent article by Charles C. Bohl with Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk (2006), long time advocates of New Urbanism, they talk about their perceived problems with contemporarily built cities and their aspiration for something "better." Speaking of the present situation, they say that with the current severe standardization of "single-use, automobile-oriented projects," the U.S. development industry has experienced a booming financial success.

Yet, the staunch opposition to growth in communities nationwide also reveals how satisfying basic needs is not enough. ... The result is a widespread dissatisfaction with growth and sprawl, and the clamoring for new methods of building communities that are more distinct, memorable, livable and worth caring about. (4)

Like the design theorists of the past, their longing for something different comes from a distaste for present conditions. And this article like the others makes no

mention of capitalism being the core problem. Capitalism wants everything to be standardized and not very unique – for were it, it would be much less easy to exchange on the market. And the quote above clearly makes that even more lucid and perhaps explains well some of what people are really longing for: The “distinct, memorable” certainly sound like very unique, unexchangeable environmental differentiations. And “livable and worth caring about” have the air of not reducing everything down to a cold exchange value, but being committed to a place for the long term.

But what approach then should be taken? From the following quote, one is lead to believe that they are not even sure; they feel like they are just grasping at straws right now:

The question remains whether any systematic approach to regulating place making and community building is capable of producing something close to “the good city.” The excessive legal, technical and administrative constraints on place making and community building present a challenge, if not a crisis for our generation’s capability to build more livable, beautiful, and enduring communities. (15) . . . A new framework must emerge that will enable a greater variety and quality of places to be preserved and built. The rural-to-urban transect represents one alternative framework to guide such change. (17)

“A crisis for our generation,” and “represents one alternative” is a far cry from surety and hope. They are in crisis mode. In the editorial preface to the same issue of this journal Donlyn Lyndon wrote, “We need intelligent new theories about how to improve the often dismal quality of the world expanding around us” (2006, 3). As revealed earlier, New Urbanism and Neo-traditional planning have been around for some time, since at least the early 1990s. Present actors are obviously feeling some serious distress over this. To understand the situation a bit better, it would be valuable to examine more closely some of the things mentioned above which they are feeling such distress over.

Upon a closer look, they say that “satisfying basic needs is not enough” (Bohl and Plater-Zyberk 2006, 4). Perhaps what they mean by this is that there is something more to life than having food, a bed, and a roof over one’s head. Still, one can only imagine that there are those who are very content in life having only some “basic needs” met, and even the most basic of human needs surely can vary from person to person.

To dissect the article further, regarding its definitions, one can only assume that the adjectives used are the qualities that “the good city” would have, but they are also highly subjective. As one looks at these words, “livable,” “worth caring about,” “beautiful,” and even the word “good” to talk about a quality of cities, all of these might be interpreted as far too relative to the individual to even be considered as valid indicators of anything. The words left are “distinct,” “memorable,” “enduring,” which are certainly also related to individual perception which is variable, but their value is perhaps a bit more measurable and their meanings relate rather strongly to another passage in this article, “What has been lacking is a more holistic, regional framework based on *character of place*” (6). The use of the word “place” with the word “character,” and given the ambiguity thus far – both in the article and in the literature thus far, one might estimate that this refers to the romanticized version of place and not so much the more clear definition, a

perception of one or more unique differentiations. Presently, with the humanistic, “home”-centered concept of “place,” a “good” place, a “sense of place,” a place where there is giving without expectation of exchange — not seeing its roots being a reaction to capitalism — why it might be so incredibly meaningful to people generally, and precisely how it is created, for many theorists and designers this seems to be not just something “mystically venerated” but literally the holy grail to be discovered.

Yet, to continue, Bohl and Plater-Zyberk say that people are “clamoring” for the “distinct, memorable, livable and worth caring about” (4) for the “beautiful, and enduring” (15). Perhaps this is speaking to an escape of the rational, repeated, exchangeable and quantified, and to instead have environments which transcend easy exchangeability — having commitment, certainty, and long-term stability. Outside of anarchy, such lasting things cannot well exist in a world saturated with ownership, and its children.

In total, from the Industrial Revolution, normative planning theorists and designers, within the confines of trying to figure a modernist *ideal* of a meaningful place design while holding to their eyes the blinders of an ownership system, have desperately and often unknowingly sought to mend the cognitive dissonance and lack of fulfillment they experience due to capitalism. That blind searching continues to this day.

Summary of Current Conditions

As one considers the literature discussed to this point, in the context of an anarchist socio-economic critique, one can see how the ownership construct has deeply affected the fields of urban planning and design. Among postmodern planning theorists, the possibility of an anarchist world evokes everything from apathy to terror to calls for capitalist-based reforms, with no voices even suggesting that anarchy be the pursuit. Among place design theorists, in search of meaning, they have gendered and sanctified “place” to psychologically escape the cruelty and repetition that the ownership construct so demands. Meanwhile, normative theorists pursue cages of endless restraints in hopes of finding an exalted pattern to strictly regulate, while blindly wrenched up over failures unending. Some seem to know what they want, but they cannot seem to find the target, when truly, though, the marvel is something that cannot be caged. There is no categorical box to put their dreams and aspirations in except that of total liberation, for in that goal of anarchy is fulfilled many dreams of postmodern theory, in it is dissolved the illusion of the holy “place” to be worshiped, and in it crumbles all regulations and formats to follow.

But how does all this help planners and designers? Without any formats or norms, and without any ownership, what is to guide the planner? And truly, that is moral? The theories within Lynch’s *The Image of the City* provide a theoretical groundwork which may lead one to conclude that **meaning creation**, as it functions, is perhaps one of, if not the only guiding principle to use in the setting of anarchist planning and design.

Connecting to Lynch

Arguably, the meaning and behavior of *place* as a perception of unique differentiation is precisely the same as the word *image* as used by Kevin Lynch (1960) in so far as how it actually functions. I will reveal this more fully in the next chapter. Presently in environmental design fields, Lynch's five elements of design are really the only things that many theorist and practitioners seem to pick out of "The Image of the City" (Castells 2003, Norberg-Schulz 2003). Though Jacobs and Appleyard have described Kevin Lynch's vision as a "place utopia" (1987, 112), perhaps revealing that some have carried out of hir writings more than simply the five elements, still, the themes of that article and Jacob's later book *Great Streets* (1993) and those of other authors presently, express that this "utopia" is still not realized or understood.

Others authors such as Kenneth Boulding (1956), and Jean Baudrillard (1995, 1998, Mann 2007), Guy Debord (Debord 1973, Marshall 1992, Koehnlein 2007), and Rudolf Arnheim (1954, 1969, 1982, Harlan 1986, Anglin, et al. 2007) often associated with the field of semiotics and the lifestyle anarchist critique, as well as attachment theorists in psychology have also theorized about how image/place functions, and even how it functions within and outside the shadows of capitalist illusions. Boulding, in hir book *The Image* (1956), though ze did not define as clearly as Lynch how image itself *functions* as a construction of value-assigned differentiations, what ze does clearly explain is what image *is* in its breadth and depth as an ever evolving mental organization. Lynch looks more so at the physical, differentiated nuts and bolts, Boulding at their system of interaction in the mind. Like Boulding, the semioticians, such as Debord and Baudrillard, also address the evolving mental organization but focus more on how humans place value on things based on their symbolism, often as it relates to capitalist constructions of ownership, and how that symbolic meaning can, very dramatically, evolve over time and circumstance. Further, attachment theorists explain *why* humans assign greater meanings as these various instances become increasingly unique. They explain why our mental system is weighted as such. Contrastingly, Lynch shows *how* those increases in meaning occur through *the physical world*. Also, unlike many of these authors above, Lynch appears to explore the topic of image much more specifically as it relates to environmental design. Thus my pursuit in this herein to analyze Lynch.

Attachment Theory

Still, the conclusions of attachment theorists over the past few decades beginning with the work of John Bowlby with hir several texts (1969, 1973, 1979, 1980) and the works of others (Parkes and Stevenson-Hinde 1982, Green and Scholes 2004) very clearly explain how meaning is created. Before addressing Lynch, I think it is appropriate to explain some of their concepts.

The central idea of attachment theory in the lives of human beings is that in infancy when one's perceptual abilities are relatively undeveloped, but the world is entirely new, one attaches to typically one of the parents to navigate and orient themselves with everything that appears to change in the world around them. The parent acts as a central ballast of constancy and orientation and as such, when that

parent leaves their presence, even for a few minutes, the infant will become irritated and cry at the loss of the parent (Parkes and Stevenson-Hinde 1982, x-xv). This pattern of behavior and orientation persists into adulthood (Marris 1982, 185). People establish other deep set points of orientation in the world, with a lover, a dearest friend, or even a place, object, or idea. They intimately get to know that very unique point of orientation and how they orient themselves mentally and physically in the world will resultantly often become severely connected to that point. “We experience [them] as unique and irreplaceable, [and they] seem to embody most crucially the meaning of our lives” (Marris 1982, 185). When or if a person perceives that that point of orientation has either changed or disappeared, a person experiences loss and grief at this loss because it was such a unique part of their lives, as being so central to their orientation in the world.

To try to understand this idea more clearly, I have constructed the diagrams in figure 2. One can see the central point of orientation and all the periphery points that are connected to it. When loss of a central orientation point occurs, people will often experience disorientation and to bridge the gap will usually end up processing the loss into some symbolic form in their own minds (Marris 1982, 195).

And as capitalism, the ownership system, does not easily facilitate long-term attachment to people and things and as attachment appears to be an absolutely essential need of human beings, even perhaps *the* central need, one can understand why capitalism might be of concern to be addressed (Marris 2004, 74-76).

One may see how this relates to Lynch as his primary concerns in *The Image of the City* appear to be how people orient themselves in the physical world and how they derive meaning from that experience. And though Lynch himself is not immune to contamination by ownership-driven fantasies, his arguments draw so close to their escape as it relates to planning and touch so fundamentally upon place/image as a function of meaning, that, desiring to understand that of which so much desperation exists, in a critical dissection, in the next chapter I examine in detail the concepts within *The Image of the City*, analyze their foundations in logic and reason, and suggest how these might be used to extrapolate more pellucid anarchist theory to help guide the fields of environmental design.




Fig. 2. Loss

CHAPTER III

A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF *THE IMAGE OF THE CITY*

In this chapter I present my primary analysis. As Kevin Lynch's book *The Image of the City* is so highly influential in the realms of professional environmental design, and as his theories more than any other author appear veritably to reach into the core of what the physical environment means to people, I have chosen to analyze this work and piece together the disjointed aspects within it with the hope of solidifying at this time the possibility of new foundational design theory, especially as it relates to anarchist planning and design. Lynch's technical ambiguity and shortages of clear, definitional connections throughout the text, I believe, have led this influential book to push current actors in environmental design to become lost to the true power of this text. In this chapter, I seek to clearly piece together Lynch's intentions, the meaning of "image" and how it complexly functions, and to postulate the possibility that what Lynch is truly pointing to is that the only core design value of all human beings is purely the experience of unique difference. Ultimately, the *perceptibly unique* is embodied in as clarified earlier, the concept of "place," but especially in Lynch's conception of "image" and is the source of all human meaning, self-orientation, and morals.

Methodology

The methodologies of this analysis consisted of a thorough reading of *The Image of the City* while taking tremendously detailed notes of it all, particularly anything to do with theoretical arguments. In this reading I sensed the disjointedness of ideas in much of the text, but simultaneously it seemed that these ideas, though not appearing to be connected to each other well, seemed to point toward a common argument. To more clearly decipher this, I chose to transpose all of my thorough notes into a word-processing computer file. I grouped concepts together according to common themes and perspectives and looked for possible correlations and contradictions among the ideas. Using these groupings, I formulated the sections of this chapter, and sought to not simply explain with more clarity what Lynch's ideas point toward, but to logically postulate what else these clarifications may mean.

Defining "Image"

Nearly fifty years ago in 1960, Kevin Lynch wrote his influential book, *The Image of the City*, and changed the way environmental designers looked at spatial locations of all scales and types. Presenting a new system of environmental design, he argued that every design scheme consists of five primary elements. Although these elements have become foundational in many fields of environmental design, the primary intent in his book appears to be 1) to help people to more easily find their way through cities and 2) to help make cities more meaningful to their inhabitants; way-finding and meaning were his goals. He seeks to do this through clarifying perceptual physical definitions to provide more effective visual cues of change for people. These visual cues consist of his five elements and are implemented through various arrangement techniques. He deduced these elements

through cognitive, way-finding studies conducted by him in several cities within the United States. The perceptual meanings – in the forms of functional and emotional meaning – are found in the unique associations we have with the composed elements. Altogether, through these visual cues and their associated values, he sought to make cities more “imageable” to people – to create stronger way-finding images in a city.

Such technical terms as “imageable,” or “imageability,” he does not always lucidly define, but simply they mean — the perception or recognition of a specific differentiation, and I will add, at any given scale (8, 112). To carry the above definition of “imageability” to another perhaps more pellucid level, from all of my analysis deciphering, comparing, and correlating ideas in this specific text, for Lynch, “image” appears to essentially mean the *very easy recognition* of a *highly unique* specific location or thing.

Lynch appears to have wanted to make things not just *very easy to recognize*, but seems to have wanted that recognition to flow into, first of all, making cities easy to find one’s way through, and secondly to carry great emotional value (125). One example he gave was that of a maze. A rough patch of wood was affixed within. A subject was placed in the laboratory maze and every time the subject would make its way through, the spot of differentiation not only let the subject know where it was, but Lynch says provided a point at which the subject felt some degree of “affection” (125-126). He also speaks of the unique landscapes of many primitive cultures. “These environments are not only highly meaningful, but their image is a vivid one” (124). Now let us return to our summarized, condensed definition, “vivid” could be substituted for the words *very easy to recognize*. Related to this definition, Lynch calls “a true *place*, remarkable and unmistakable” (92). That seems to go even further than just *very easy to recognize* – but “remarkable and unmistakable” evokes it being *highly unique* in its form, relationship to other locations and things, and interaction with people. Much of the following of this chapter is devoted to showing how Lynch points toward the definition of image as something ‘*highly unique* and thus *very easy to recognize*’.

To add some even greater clarity to his definition, Lynch says “image” consists of three parts: *Identity* – distinctiveness, *Structure* – how it relates to other things, and *Meaning* – “practical or emotional” (8). Logically, each of these aspects of an image may be quite unique on its own. If an item is distinctive in its characteristics, we understand specifically what it is. We attach a definition to it, defining its particular characteristics. The rough board in the maze, it is made of wood and has a specific size and texture, thus this item has a distinct *identity*. Perceptually we can also sense that it is definitively different from the items around it. Shape, movement, color, scent, texture, distance from other items reveal *how it is different* from those things around it and the *relationship* or way those differences play off each other. The rough board is distinctively different than the smooth wooden walls and floors throughout the rest of the maze. A subject may sense its distance from a specific turn, or its placement within a corridor, or in its distance from the beginning or end of the maze – it perceives *structure*. Meaningfully, we may *understand* how far we are from the beginning or end of the maze, our spatial location, and *feel* greater security and stability in that unique comprehension of orientation. To find something profoundly different than anywhere else may take us by surprise, or it may satisfy a need to find difference, a grounding point amid a

maze of sameness. Logically, the inseparable first two parts result in the appearance of the third. And this third part of *image* I expand more upon below.

Lynch only posed that identity, structure, and meaning function as the three parts of image and did not take this triad of constituents to any lengths beyond this. Logically, one might also seek to conceptualize these ideas in several visual and formulaic ways. In a visual way, one way might be in the form of a web of many things, each with their own unique identity and a unique structural relationship to other things. This might be similar to figure 2. To simplify this, one might come up with a diagram like figures 3 or 4. *a* represents identity, *b* represents the structure. One might also conceptualize the three parts of image as working together on a continuum, see figure 5. As seen – as the *identity* and *structure* change, perceived as becoming increasingly different or not, this is the determinant of greater or lesser meaning and image clarity for people. Arguably, *meaning* might reasonably act as part of a feedback loop such as figure 6 – a somewhat reasonable conclusion if one accepts and, very simply, applies Lynch’s triad idea, or it might be configured that *identity* and *structure* each carry both *physical* and *non-physical* characteristics or *perceptions of difference*, and those perceptions are the determinants of orientation, and thus *meaning*. This analysis more predominantly uses the former (figure 5). Yes, these particular conceptualizations of the three parts might very well be constructed in several other ways, too, which will be discussed later, but for now these general constructions provide some relatively clear visualizations of it for use within this text.




Fig. 3. 1st construct of identity and structure




Fig. 4. 2nd construct of identity and structure




Fig. 5. 1st construct of the triad parts of image




Fig. 6. 2nd construct of the triad parts of image

Lynch maintains that, “Way finding is the original function of environmental image, and the basis on which its emotional associates are founded” (125). In another instance from his main statement about the triad parts of image (8), Lynch argues *meaning* encompasses both understanding or *practicality*, **and** feelings or *emotions*. These two statements may not entirely coincide. Simply throwing practicality and emotions in the same box labeled “meaning” does not appear to pull in a critical eye. Debatably, Lynch’s latter statement sounds more true—one’s *practical* understanding is being able to find one’s way among unique physical and non-physical perceptions of difference and that all *emotional* perceptions/meanings are indeed “founded” in that *practical* “way finding” alone (125). Thus, way finding itself forms the core of all human meaning. This will be explained more fully in the section “Order/Chaos.” A clear, sure image, highly unique, very easy to recognize, evokes knowledge of where one is in reference to other things and evokes “strong impressive meaning” (5) and does so arguably in a morally *positive* or *negative* manner. Lynch did not directly touch upon how morals might individually be founded either, but this chapter will also draw conclusions from Lynch and attachment theorists, which will address that, too.

These are the leading issues critiqued herein and they point one down a path of anarchist planning by helping one understand how individual human meaning is created absent of systems of ownership, public or private.

Similar to present-time planning and design critics, the lack of positively strong images in certain cities is a key reason why Lynch wrote his book. Lynch says that most cities suffer from “faceless sprawl at the periphery” (94) and that many design problems need to both re-enforce existing images and *find* images within those “faceless” suburbs (115-6). And so, in pursuit of this rejuvenation came Lynch’s five elements.

The Five Elements

Lynch’s five elements are typically applied contemporarily by practitioners to urban and park environments, but certainly may be applied elsewhere. Simply, they provide a framework for understanding various environments. These elements are categories for environmental, definitional cues, indicating change, allowing one to find their way, and infusing meaning all along. The five elements are – path, edge, district, node, and landmark. A given person may consider a specific cue, to be a certain element and not another, or perhaps they may perceive the cue as having characteristics of two or more elements. Perception of elements vary from person to person, but essentially, the elements provide a general framework for understanding the unique structure of an image/place.

Often, in the form of symbols, environmental designers apply these elements two dimensionally in ways similar to the studies Lynch conducted, and such applications are professionally referred to as “Lynch diagrams.” Planners and designers use these symbolic diagrams to help them visualize how a location is or could be used, and how it is organized in its parts. Often the elements though are not applied with the intention of creating a strong, sure image in a location, but simply for organizational purposes.

Still, they could be used to more clearly separate, define, differentiate, or contrast the various parts of a place. And, if these are indeed what people use to find

their way and meaning – then, reasonably, perhaps they should be strengthened (46). Below, I will explain each of the elements:

A path is simply somewhere or something having a directional component in which travel occurs. It may be a pedestrian walkway, a worn dirt path, a bicycle path, a road for automobiles, train tracks, a monorail track, a bridge, a river (47).

A district is an *area* in which one perceives a common characteristic. It may be a neighborhood of predominantly residential dwellings, a business district, a street of restaurants, a cluster of dormitories, at a different scale, an entire college campus. The common characteristic may be the land use, or the physical characteristics of the buildings or elements in the street (47).

An edge is a boundary which is most likely permeable to some degree or another. It may be a wall or fence, a freeway or road, railroad tracks, or even the edge of a district (47).

A node is a specific location which one is able to enter, and at which a change takes place or activities are concentrated (47). A heightened awareness may often accompany entering a node simply because it is a spot of change – especially in a journey (74). It may be a crossroads, the end point of one road and the beginning of another, points of “events on a journey,” a change in transportation modes, a gateway or portal – between buildings or places, or the core place of activity for a district (47-8).

A landmark is a point of reference, or cue, which is external and usually unto which one does not enter, for it is used predominantly only to keep one’s bearings on a journey. It may be something as large as “an isolated tower” or a “great hill” in the distance, as ubiquitous as the sun overhead, or as small as “signs, store fronts, trees, doorknobs, and other urban details” (48)

One might imagine the ways that any of these five elements above might be made more unique, more identifiable using the triad parts of image. Lynch does comment further about each of the elements and how to strengthen their image, but does so without necessarily defining things very clearly in the start of the book nor linking the rest of the text with his definitions; thus the reader must search and piece together the meaning of image for themselves, as mentioned earlier on. Though throughout the text, lacking a strong operational definition, he does consistently emphasize the importance of unique differentiation in the physical environment, perhaps consciously or unconsciously pointing the reader in the direction of creating strong images, *highly unique*, and thus *very easy to recognize*. Below are some examples of this pointing – particularly regarding some of the five elements and how they relate to the three parts of image.

When speaking of paths, Lynch says that streets need length, uniqueness, and stability (in width, building uses, etc.) – and when these qualities change, the road mentally becomes a new road (52-3). Clearly a path needs some measure of length or else it is not a path. Stability or “continuity” in an aspect, or aspects, of design and use provide a means for a uniform recognition of a path, wherever one happens to be along it. Though not recounting directly here the three parts of image, Lynch speaks of them, or at least of *identity* and *structure*, when he says, “Where major paths lacked identity, or were easily confused one for the other, the entire city image was in difficulty.” And lacking an identity, or being easily confused with other streets exhibits a lack of distinctiveness, of uniqueness. At other times throughout the book Lynch also points toward this idea (61, 91). But his lack of

trying to tie them together suggests that perhaps ze had not directly put hir finger upon precisely how imageability is created — through uniqueness.

As I lead into nodes, Lynch purports that to make up for a less meaningful path with a weak continuous image, one could strengthen the termini at its ends (54, 100). Regarding the three parts of image, this is a strategy in which one abandons *identity* for strengthening *structure*. The relational aspects of image elements are strengthened by increasing the contrast or differentiation just outside or next to that original element, in this case a path. Again, here one strengthens the uniqueness of an element, at least its larger *structural* component, to fortify the overall image.

Nodes, as well as districts, Lynch indicates can be introverted (less connected to other places) or extroverted (clearly connected) (77-78). For introverted places, one clearly comprehends that they are leaving or approaching them, and the “sensation on arrival is simply ‘here I am.’ ” As one moves through the environment, perhaps there are very few distinctive cues referencing and leading one to that poignantly differentiated, *introverted* destination. For extroverted places, on the other hand, one can more clearly sense the relationship that a place has with the places around it. And when traveling to and fro, the differentiation of spacial elements is more stark, and so one’s awareness of their relationships is heightened. Both of these points deal with *structure*, the perceptual relationship between places, and their *significance* increases as their *uniqueness* of structural relationships increases.

“The most successful node seemed both to be *unique* in some way and at the same time to intensify some surrounding characteristic” (emphasis added) (77). This quote is another good example pointing once again toward how unique differentiation is key to making a location *very easy to recognize*. This quote also reveals the coupling power of placing unique differentiations together. One highly unique element of a location placed with another highly unique element, together they synergistically *structurally* work to make an image or place even more special, even more different. Later, Lynch repeats this emphasis when ze speaks of how clasping a node and landmark together strengthens the *significance* of that landmark (81). And herein, with this example, are the three parts of image manifest: An environmental feature being unique in itself, it relating to other features in a specific spacial way, and those elements carrying “practical and emotional” significance.

In relation to landmarks, sounds and smells (some non-physical characteristics) can reinforce them (83). Such sensual perceptions are not necessarily physically designable, but like the example above, coupling some perceptual differentiation (like the smell of fresh, hot bread) with a perceived physical differentiation (such as a landmark), synergistically, once again, adds yet another differentiation to a larger, now even more distinctive image. Lynch speaks of similar enhancements to a location by way of placing uniquely contrasting buildings by each other (76) and clustering landmarks together (101).

Resultantly, using the three parts of image, Lynch’s various elements can be differentiated to strengthen an overall image – making it more distinguishable, and thus easier to find one’s way through, and more meaningful to people on the whole. Such a basic structural understanding may help us in an anarchist society to enhance the meaningfulness of a location or thing without the distortions of ownership. This enrichment of way-finding and meaning through the avenue of image may also be accomplished at sundry scales.

Scale

In several places, Lynch emphasizes the importance of image on the spectrum of scales. As mentioned, something as small as a doorknob or smaller is possible (48). One might suppose that Lynch's elements could go as large as a planet, solar system or galaxy (considering them as nodes or districts), given way finding with a relatively quick means of interstellar travel. In such instances, one uses unique differences in galactic layouts to find one's way. And thus trusting in this idea of scale variability, the Lynch elements can be applicable on all levels.

Regarding city scales though, strategies of structuring urban form include places-within-places, minor and major elements, and places or landmarks and nodes along a path (112-3). In all such instances, the way-finder uses the three parts of image to sense one's location, not only among features immediately around the self, but in relation to the small or large-scaled elements of the larger city image, whether one is at a specific restaurant in a neighborhood (a landmark within a district), walking through a town, known for its peculiar prominent hill, on a sidewalk along a fence in front of someone's yard while across the street is a path of railroad tracks (a unifying major landmark accompanying multiple scales of paths and edges), or walking past a colorful hydrant while high above is a water tower along a boulevard on one's way from a small bus stop toward the entrance to a monorail station just a block away (multiple scales of nodes and landmarks along a path).

Specifically, Lynch introduces the three possible techniques above for implementing the five elements, particularly at a metropolitan scale. The first is a places-within-places scenario called "a static hierarchy" in which a geometric pattern of elements is repeated at every scale (112). The weakness of this is that it may lack complexity, particularly if one gets rigorously mathematical with it, for at every scale you go, the structure is repeated (113). The second technique is a major and minor element scenario in which there are "one or two very large dominant elements" unto which sub-elements are related; he warns though that if a spacial area around the dominant/large-scale element is too expansive, or the element itself is not dominant enough for a vast area, the element will lose its unifying power. The third is an elements along a path scenario, specifically "a network of ... sequences": the events or features along one's journey – the story of the journey "at any level or in any direction." This essentially says that sequences may happen everywhere and on multiple scales. On a journey, from beginning to end, spacial elements come in a mnemonic "melody," a "symmetry," a "reversibility" allowing one to find one's way from one distinctive element to the next (113-115). Be that as it may, Lynch seemed to conclude that all of these techniques still only observe the city as a collection of parts and not as a whole metropolitan image (113, 114), but he says that these ways of comprehending a larger image coupled with one's personal experience of the image can help one come to better understand their relationship with it and to aid one in making more informed choices in the changing of that image (116-117). And from all of these techniques, one can see the three parts of image at work: identity, structure, and meaning (115).

Lynch speaks of how "a city must have an obvious structure," but also intricacy and layers enough for deep exploration (158). Dodging specific definition, vocabulary such as "obvious structure" again points "image" toward being *very easy to recognize, highly unique*. "Complex," explorable layers suggest an array of design

scales. And “complex” does not necessarily mean cluttered, but certainly cluttered or clean, hodgepodge or master-planned, they each can contribute to creating diverse environments with complex relationships, occurring at interwoven multiple scales.

When considering figures 2, 3, and 4 and how scale might be conceptualized in these visualizations, I have constructed figures 7 and 8. Figure 7 shows in a very rudimentary way how 3 and 4 might be expanded on as far as perceptual scale of places/images. There are three perceived differentiations of *identities*, the first is element a_1 , the second is element a_2 . They have a uniquely perceived *structural* relationship which is b_1 . When one perhaps zooms out one level, one can see that they are characteristics that uniquely make up *identity* a_3 . If one contemplates figure 8, it relates very strongly to figure 7 as it demonstrates a changing of perceived scales, but also to figure 2 in which change or loss of orientational ballast is experienced. That change in a major point of orientation can be perceived on multiple physical and mental scales.




Fig. 7. 1st scaled construct

Fig. 8. 2nd scaled construct

Lynch explains that when a person first enters an environment new to them, they primarily use the larger scaled elements to find their way; only as familiarity increases do they start using the smaller scaled elements, even eventually abandoning, conceptually, the larger scaled elements to find their way (67). To not feel lost on a larger scale is their first priority, so they seek to make sense of this larger world.

But what does this mean, *to make sense*? It means to perceive order.

Order/Chaos

Human beings, and many other animals, have the auspicious knack of finding their way no matter how little environmental differences occur (132-3). Fortunately, there are very few if any instances when a creature perceives absolutely no unique environmental differentiations with which to orient the self. This is complete chaos, when nothing through one’s perceptions can be differentiated from anything else. As Lynch does not go so far as to concretely define this extreme state of no perceptible differentiations – except by how people *feel* near unto it – truly, it may be helpful for one to picture the extremes so as to better comprehend the meaning of chaos and order for ourselves, especially from a design standpoint. Jane

Jacobs lingers in such thoughts in his chapter “Some Myths about Diversity” (1972, 224). In several instances, Lynch speaks of order and chaos, though I propose he did not go far enough so as to logically connect them definitionally to be part of the same creature. As I will show, in a circular manner – where one ends, the other may begin. See figure 9. First though, it would be good to understand even more clearly what order and chaos are through Lynch’s perspective.

Lynch says that, “Complete chaos without a hint of connection is never pleasurable” (6). Chaos is *experienced* when one spatially and/or non-spatially loses their way, when one cannot perceptually seem to make sense of the world




Fig. 9. The circle of chaos and order

around them. Arguably, such chaos might also come in the form of known environmental elements changing, thus disorienting the self, making it more difficult to find one’s way. Lynch proposes that all “mobile organism[s must] be oriented in their surroundings” or “terror” will result. (125). So, not only is it far from “pleasurable,” it may come as a feeling of terror. If one cannot seem to find or has given up on finding an orienting resolve, one may even perhaps experience a feeling of sheer madness or a disconcerting cognitive dissonance. Still, to escape the terror of disorientation many people are driven to find or give order to the universe around them – they become desperate to perceive the differentiations, and then how they relate to each other and to themselves. Driven, to find their relationship with the environment around them.

Logically, this may indeed be more difficult when fewer differentiations occur. Lynch says that featureless environments are not “legible” (5). This word, “legible,” is one of those technical terms similar to “imageable” that is often thrown around in the text without a solid definition. Looking in a lexicon, it means: “capable of being read or deciphered : PLAIN” (Merriam-Webster 1991). So, if it is legible (a word usually to do with reading and writing), one can read it and decipher it – make sense of what it says, understand it. And “plain,” reasonably, does not point toward dull, but toward it being *very easy* to understand, even *quite obvious to understand*. So if an environment is “legible,” it is not confusing, but very obviously understandable, quite easy to sense the unique differentiation of features – and especially one’s relationship to them. This word, legible, fits nicely with the deduced meaning of the word “image”: *very easy to recognize, highly unique* in its form. The

more clear the image, the more legible or easy to understand.

So now in this state of complete chaos, perhaps one suddenly perceives one single differentiation, the sea is below and the sky above. And then senses another, the sun blazing in the sky. Another, an island in the distance. And then another, and another, and another, and another, and another, and another are perceived. And as that number of differentiations on every scale grow more and more divided, theoretically, however impossibly improbable, but theoretically on the circle of chaos and order (figure 9), a person could reach the point where perceptually one could no longer sense the differentiations. The person is so flooded on every scale and in every perceived way by differentiations to the point where one once again enters a state of total chaos, like looking at a television screen of snow. Understanding this circle of order and disorder may help point us toward a better understanding of differentiations themselves.

I have not fully contemplated the implications of this circle of understanding, but I think it is helpful to carry us out beyond the limits of Lynch's storytelling, of trekking across the same-looking arctic ice with only a compass and stars to guide, or traveling over vast swaths of land with little of topography to show the way (Lynch, 130, 132). The lesson of Lynch's stories is, as I said before, that people can comprehend image under the most extremely limited conditions. The clarity I am seeking to add here is that *the unique differentiations*, however slight they are, are what make these environments legible, and thus meaningful.

One might also examine the other side of the circle – where order appears on the decline, and chaos is mounting. In these cases, as people experience chaos, they seek to mend it through associating it with the more familiar until they get to know the uniqueness there. Though not picturing it as a circle, Lynch addresses this when he tells of how even if the streets are a chaotic maze of twisting and turning, people will actually try to draw the streets as a grid (63). They are so desperate to make sense of the chaos, transform it, to end the terror of that disorder in their minds, that they associate it with a something more familiar – a grid system. This hints also at other ways of coping through familiarity. Ironically, even in a location where initially everything seems quite chaotic, quite out of order, as people become more familiar with the location they begin to discover its unique differentiations and find order out of the initial chaos. Simply, familiarity brings order also(6). And order is comforting, appeasing the alarm (127).

One might also consider that other extreme of that grid system mentioned (see figure 10) in which everything is orderly to the point of repeated sameness. If there are differentiations, but they are all the same, then one cannot find their way in that it is still like the darkness without stars, or like a television screen of snow.

Also, a type of personal, anarchist, postmodern morality might be conceived of this too. This will be discussed in more detail later, but when we experience a *change* in the known *identity* of an element of orientation, or a *change* in the known *structure* between elements of




Fig. 10. A grid of repeated sameness

orientation, we may sometimes experience some degree of disorientation or terror — which we thus value as negative. When we experience perceptions which *strengthen* our existing perceptions of the known order, we may often value this as positive. So

this perception of chaos and order is perhaps the primary factor in the determination of human meaning and accompanying morality. Before exploring this more though, below will be examined some additional ways Lynch suggests the elements might be ordered.

Organizing the Elements

To better implement his elements, Lynch presents ten qualities of form which can bring greater clarity to an image (105-108) – making them more distinctive, easier to recognize. Ze calls these ten the “qualities that a designer may operate upon”; still, one could not call these ten mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive by any means, one may certainly think of other ways besides these that image might be constructed, but it is a list of ways of seeing image which give the designer a place to start. And though here again and throughout these announced ten forms, Lynch does not make direct connections to how image functions in its three parts, ze does, at times, speak of the three parts individually. So, when writing this section, perhaps his understanding of them was not quite thoroughly formulated into seeing image in the three parts ze postulates in the introduction. Still, for the most part the reader is left to either make the larger connections on their own or live in relative mental disarray.

To make those connections now: A designer may use these ten qualities of form to better organize the five elements, to more uniquely find implementation of the three parts of image. With every one of the ten, his emphasis is on increasing the contrast of each feature or location with the surrounding urban tissue – to make it more uniquely stand out – to strengthen the image. Each form is applied to clarify the image of a specific element, several individual elements, or several elements working together to create a larger image.

The first form quality, “*Singularity* or figure-background clarity” essentially means that the element or elements are singularly different, one of a kind, to the point of being extremely different than the surrounding urban fabric. Lynch here uses words like “remarkable” and “vivid” to specifically describe the *qualities* of the element – its *identity*, *structure*, and *meaning* (the three parts of image). Again, ze does not refer directly back to the three parts of image, but simply speaks of the qualities of those three parts. For instance, ze speaks of the “boundary” of a location (comparable to the edges of the rough place in the maze). Further, ze utters of the “contrast of surface, form, intensity, complexity, size, use, spatial location.” That ze includes “spatial location” (*structure*) as part of a list that deals with *identity*, nor definitively brings up the three parts throughout this section points to a failure to weave in definitional connections. (105). Still, when ze writes of “the observer’s experience” (*meaning*) in the next sentence, such separations suggest an understanding of the three, but without clarity. In the closing sentence, ze quietly, non-definitively, links back to the definition of “image” itself and its relation to experiencing *meaning*: “Observers, [with] familiarity ... delight more and more in contrast and uniqueness which vivify the scene.” Here the word “contrast,” and once again “uniqueness” and a form of the word “vivid” – each return us to the earlier assembled definition of being *very easy to recognize, highly unique*.

For the rest of the ten I will not delve into such deep analysis as above, but the first provided several very good examples of failure to make definitional links

and give clarity to the reader – which is so prominent throughout this book, thus this herein analytical exposé.

The second quality is *form simplicity*. Lynch purports that often simple geometric shapes are more clearly recognizable than the complex. So when applied to an image, seeing only a part of it, one can more easily recognize the whole (105). This relates to an image's identity. Ze suggests that due to the human tendency to perceive a jumble of disorderly streets as something approximating a grid, we should strive make images grid-like or in a recognizable geometry. This sounds wrong. It is clearly not collectively exhaustive. Form simplicity may be seen from a spectrum perspective, in which form is distinctly geometrically recognizable at one end and not at the other, but his wording that "Forms of this nature [a geometric nature] are more easily incorporated into image," disjointedly ignores this. Yes, at the least it provides a simple framework for design – a place to start. Also, when striving for a rather instant recognition, simple geometry (the familiarity of mathematical constants) will do. But such schemes may exclude the *highly unique*, placing limits on form diversity; so when wanting to create highly unique form, as a guide, this second quality may not always be acceptable.

The third quality is *continuity* – "bestowing a single identity" (106). Going back to the maze example, the rough spot has a continuous, repeated quality of roughness, thus its identity is known to the observer. One senses that continuous quality and so one knows it is different from the continuous quality of whatever surrounds.

The fourth quality is *dominance* – size, intensity, or interest resulting in something being perceptually dominating over related things (106). Certainly this relates to *identity* itself, but more to *structure* – the relationships or ways differences play off or relate to each other.

Clarity of joint, the fifth quality, concerns the level of clearness of points or lines at which the five elements meet. Clarity of this quality relates to how different elements structurally relate to each other. The transition at such locations may be rather stark, or quite smooth or gradual. Lynch proposes that, "These are the strategic moments of structure and should be highly perceptible." His use of the word "structure" seems to indicate an understanding of the three parts of image. "Should be *highly* perceptible" (emphasis added) appears to fortify the "very" recognizable aspect of *image*, but one might read into this also that transitions perhaps should not be gradual – a rather stark absolutist position. Rather, given that meaning comes from the perception of unique difference, differentiations of all kinds ought to be of paramount value, even the differentiation into sameness and of gradual transitions. And though subtle environmental changes may approach a maddening chaos, certainly the subtle can be just as telling to the observer. A 'no-man's land' or long transition between places may provide a solace for sensory rest or quiet mental reflection. Still, the clarity of joints is important. For when the points and seams between unique differentiations are clear, people are more sure of where they are.

The next quality is *directional differentiation*, meaning that elements of an image have *structural* relationships with each other: 'up a hill,' "away from the sea," "toward the center." Lynch says that, "These qualities are heavily used in structuring on the larger scale," but are most certainly used on smaller scales too – the back of the room, the north side of the pond, toward the front of the house. The final four

qualities relate more to personal perception than to actual physical aspects of image.

The *visual scope* concerns the range and penetration of sight (106). It is the breadth and depth of a vista. It includes both the completely visible and the extrapolated. In ways related to singularity, form simplicity, and continuity, features largely hidden from view except for a tiny portion or portions may be mentally extrapolated and comprehended as part of the larger image – adding to an even greater spacial sense of where one is in relation to both local and distant features. This quality is also affected by the level of visual permeability that elements have (like through windows or archways). Topography and “axial street” patterns also play a role. These may, of course, be condensed down to constituent elements such as districts, landmarks, and paths (106). Lynch says that a sign of a characteristic activity or feature can hint of an element soon coming along one’s journey (107). Hir use of the word “activity” is interesting in that it is telling of the possible limitations of Lynch’s five elements in that they are predominantly sold to the reader as being physical features and do not typically represent people and their activities. Later, I will discuss activities, people, and memories as part of image. Undoubtedly, they can be highly unique and carry all three aspects of image.

The eighth quality is *motion awareness*. In simple terms, it means, sensing unique differentiations in 3-D and, reciprocally, being able to find one’s way through it all (107). Here Lynch uses phrases like “visual and kinesthetic senses” and “motion parallax and perspective.” It may be argued that these are not form qualities at all, but rather abilities of the observer – for it arguably varies from person to person. For whatever reason, a child may have a different perceptual scope than an adult. And depending on one’s circumstances and frame of mind at the time, logically, perception – it will again vary from person to person. As evident from the studies by Lynch in his book, different people perceive and move through the same places differently. A primary lesson that might be learned from this eighth form quality is that as the image becomes more clear as unique differentiations occur, it does not matter the value one person places on one particular feature or group of features, but only whether the identity, structure and meaning are *perceptually* different than at other locations, so that one may identify a location, its relationship to other locations and find meaning through awareness of their unique interaction – all in whatever ways or speeds one is in motion through it. Or, when in movement, image is clear.

Time series is the ninth quality – a melodic or rhythmic series of built forms/images (107). This quality relates to motion awareness, structure, and to how continuity is altered along one’s journey. To call it ‘the geographic morphology of the landscape’ puts it rather coldly, but may help one to see this in a more understandable light. From a postmodern perspective in which people find value in listening to “music” with no rhythm or melody at all, considering this perspective of valuing extreme disorder, even chaos, and then others valuing the highly structured, repeating even into a chaos as well, and then everything in between – considering this, the quality of a time series may be considered irrelevant by some. But for the sake of deliberately constructing diversity, understanding how this quality plays itself out may be valuable. Lynch claims to have little understanding of this and encourages others to theoretically explore this more: “We need fresh thought on forms which are perceived over time, as well as on design archetypes which exhibit a melodic sequence of image elements or a formed succession of space, texture,

motion, light, or silhouette.” I will discuss this matter of melody and poetry later on; consider though that perhaps when creating or choosing a design one ought to look at the locations around a to-be-designed location or series of locations, consider the circular spectrum of chaos and order and examine the spectrum of difference and non-difference in which the image moves and breathes and then choose to make it different, even to design a morphology or compose a symphony accordingly. The factor of fulfilling needs might also be considered, but I will introduce that later.

The final form quality is both *names and meanings* – though they are not necessarily designable (108). To summarize Lynch, the people, events, and memories of interaction, and the street names and numbers that one associates in their mind with a location absolutely affect how one finds their way and meaning. They can “enhance the imageability of an element,” and “strongly reinforce ... identity [and] structure,” but ironically are relatively “non-physical characteristics.” Outrightly, Lynch states, with this admission, that there is something more to way-finding and meaning than purely physical elements – which reveals an additional incompleteness in his theories. And if they indeed “enhance imageability,” through reason, it would be because, like the physical, the non-physical functions as part of the triad parts of image and is perceptually *very easy to recognize*, even *highly unique*. I would also postulate here that the uniqueness of a location can be due to the perception of merely one physical characteristic or one non-physical, multiples of either, but is often some combination of physical and non-physical characteristics, acting together. Later in this work I will argue this more thoroughly, but for now, Lynch himself has other points to make about the non-physical.

In various places in the book, beyond the ten qualities of form, Lynch touches on these non-physical qualities and how they affect our perception of locations. Certainly a dominant value of grid street networks is to provide certainty of one’s position (104), but this physical value spills over into “maps, street numbers, ... [and] signs” to help people from getting lost (4). And with “coordinates, numbering systems, or abstract names – we often miss ... [the] vivid concreteness of unmistakable form” (128). Two points here. This quote most surely asserts, once again, the image of a place as being *very easy to recognize* and *highly unique* – “vivid,” “unmistakable.” It also proposes that the non-physical can trump the physical in its perceived value. And two, from this quote, this sounds rather disturbing to Lynch. Still, it sounds as if his disappointment is perhaps due to people’s *initial* use of them for way-finding – instead of reliance on unique form. Ze explains that naming, numbering and their often related grids often only help one through their initial maneuvering to and through a location. These non-physical features help people to find their way on the larger scales, but as familiarity grows, street signs and numbers lose their way-finding value, and the distinctive details, however titanic or minute, find the greater value in one’s mind (6). And also, reasonably, as familiarity grows and some non-physical aspects lose value, other non-physical aspects – such as people and events – gain value in their, however slight, association with the physical. I shall not endeavor to postulate about other possible categories of elements beyond Lynch’s five, but for at least this section it will suffice to say that there are physical and non-physical aspects of locations, they function with each other as part of the three parts of image and their value in terms of way-finding and meaning is singly derived from the perception of their uniqueness. Some of these ten also indicate Lynch’s desire to include the non-

physical in an image’s design, but perhaps a slight shortness of sight about *how* to include them in his design theory.

Still, as may be seen above, through both physical design and the non-physical, these ten qualities at the least shed light on how to, and provide a starting point for, applying the three parts of image, to strengthen a location’s image, to strengthen its unique differentiation.

When speaking of Florence, Italy – Lynch wrote, “To these clear and differentiated forms people have made strong attachments.... Every scene is instantly recognizable....” (92) Of course, “instantly recognizable” strengthens our clarified definition of image, but what of the words “strong attachment”? What might lead someone to be strongly attached to a location? From the quote, it might be inferred that Lynch means that such strong “attachment” comes through the perception of unique differentiation, but still, “attachment” itself perhaps should be examined further. Much has been spoken of thus far about creating “legible” environments for people to more easily find their way through and clearly meaning is derived from unique environmental differentiations, but what meaning *is*, beyond simply orientation, has not been much addressed thus far herein. I conclude from analyzing Lynch in these final sections that the perception of *orientation*, based on the many forms of unique perceptions, is the only source of meaning.

Meaning

Lynch purports that the third part of image – meaning – consists of “practical [and] emotional” meaning (8). Up to this point, this chapter has addressed the practical meaning associated with physical way finding, but not so much the practical meaning as it relates to non-physical attributes associated with way-finding, nor the subject of emotional meaning. In the following several sections, I will examine his statements regarding these topics and how they might be understood with greater clarity. I begin by presenting in this section my conclusions and then explain in subsequent sections how I came to them based on my analysis of *The Image of the City* and references to other texts.

It seems reasonable to deduce that an individual’s spacial and non-spacial orientation causes both meaning itself and personal morality. The only way one is able to find one’s way through space, and any non-spacial territory, is by perceiving unique differentiations there — by perceiving unique images. It appears that Lynch very well addresses meaning on the *practical* level of physical way-finding, but he does not so much address way finding according to non-physical forms. I will argue that they are more similar than not.




Fig. 11. The moral spectrum construct

As far as *emotional* meaning, Lynch appears to scarcely speak of it. I contend that Lynch’s emotional aspect of meaning is only experienced when our

orientation is either weakened or enhanced. As mentioned earlier on, what I mean by this is when a perception acts to fortify our image of orientation, then we emotionally and morally experience it as positive or good. When a perception acts to contradict or threaten our understanding of orientation, then it is perceived as negative or bad (See figure 11). In later sections, I do not delve deeply into any of the coping mechanisms or recovery processes associated with contradictions, threats, and relatedly the disappearances or transformations of orientation points, but simply propose that the more we use a unique perception as a guidepost, be it something physical or non-physical in our lives, the more it will carry emotional and moral value when its image is reinforced or weakened. Thus, I propose that orientation alone is the source of all human meaning.




Fig. 12. The triad parts of image as a function

Assuming that regardless of whether a point of orientation in life is physical or non-physical, its identity and structural relationship with other things does indeed exist. If one were to try to picture the three parts of image as a mathematical function it might appear like figure 12. This might seem simplistic, but such a model may help to better conceptualize how perception might be occurring over time. Here *a* represents *identity*, *b* represents *structure*, *c* represents *meaning*. At time-index 1 (P_1), certain things about the identity and structure are perceived and together they create orientation or meaning. At time-index 2 (P_2), more knowledge about the point and about its relationships is gained. This helps one to understand the very unique aspects of the reference point and the added knowledge about its surroundings helps one to be even more sure of the situation at hand. As well, knowledge acquisition about that reference point may continue without end. There are other things to consider about this model though – changes over time would mean memories (non-physical characteristics) and would not that act as a perceptual feedback loop? Yes, one might consider constructing a feedback loop model, but when I considered several other potential models in which *c* would feedback into the function or directly into *a* and *b*, it was ending up too mathematically complex for the extent of this project, though certainly such a pursuit could be a project for more research in the future. With this model, when changes in a known characteristic occur, the old characteristic still remains as a distinctive perception, an historical perception, but a perception still nonetheless. As well, it is important to see here also that the importance of this reference point, this person, place or thing is not just in it having its own very unique identity, but also in its immensely unique and intertwined structural relationship to so many other people, places, and things.

One might also consider examining again several of the diagrams already discussed, to thus give one a better understanding of what is occurring. When one examines, for instance, figure 2, which coincides with ideologies of Attachment Theory, one can see how a dramatic change might occur. When one central point of unique orientation goes away, or changes in a dramatic way, then the person using that point as a predominant reference, they may experience loss and disorientation,

and may even consider it as not a good or pleasant thing. If it is a person that unexpectedly changes or is lost, one might grieve or feel anger; if it is a memory or a social or religious idea that is challenged or clearly disproved, one might regard it as morally wrong, deny it, or in a state of acceptance, find themselves completely reevaluating the purpose of life; if it is a place or a thing that is lost or changed, one might experience sadness, try to reconstruct it in a symbolic way to physically memorialize it, or may feel enraged at the moral atrocity of the loss. All of these responses may be interchangeable with the others, but when one perceives a contradiction, threat, change or a loss of a key unique point of reference, it is usually taken as being negative or even morally wrong. When perceptions of a highly unique reference point are reinforced, one likely experiences it as positive and morally right. See again figure 11.

Much of these arguments relate to the immense relativity of perception. Lynch makes several points which may be seen to fortify these concepts, other points which appear to contradict them. In some instances, there are references to need fulfillment regarding meaning creation in its various forms, and other references to non-physical reference points. In these next few sections, I will try to show how a study of his sundry points in these regards yields the conclusions above, and thus leads one to consider new directional courses in all avenues environmental design, but especially in the pursuit of anarchist planning. These conclusions are especially important to the anarchist planner in that they help one to understand morality and meaning creation in the absence of any sort of authority, be that authority a person, religion, government, or otherwise.

Before jumping immediately into discussing non-physical orientation and meaning creation it is important to reveal the worthiness of ignoring need fulfillment in physical design. This is perhaps important to understand as so many planners and designers have fallen for this additional deception of the ownership construct, that needs can be quantified and categorized for exchange, separating living from life, enslaving planners, designers, and people generally, in the cages of needs. When fundamentally, only personal orientation matters.

Human Needs

Running contrary to some explanations by Lynch that the perception of relatively stable, unique differentiations is the cause of attachment, in a general review of *The Image of the City*, instead of understanding that meaning is purely derived through perceptions of difference challenging or affirming orientation, one might be very tempted to diagnose from Lynch that meaning, in many instances, comes through the fulfillment of *various* desires. Lynch does appear to purport this, but a thorough exploration of his possible argument helps one understand why the plurality of needs is a false conclusion. The essential weakness of them all is that because needs, wants, or desires vary from person to person, their level of fulfillment cannot be used as a reliable gauge of something's value. Ultimately and fundamentally, this section seeks also to help show how *orientation* is the *only* consistently universal need.

Because needs vary, can be artificially created, and as probability statistics are never 100% in the affirmative, to be semantically clear, in this text I make no definitional distinction between "needs" and "wants." "Need" is encompassed about

by the word “required,” but it cannot always be considered universal – as so many “needs” (even ones necessary for immediate survival) vary from person to person. Arguably, one may need something but not want it, and vice versa — which presents an additional problem in definitional agreement. If a person desires a long life, they may need to eat healthy food and exercise regularly, if not, then they may consume and partake of other things – “needs” vary. Moreover, many, such as Guy Debord (1973, Marshall 1992, Koehnlein 2007) and Jean Baudrillard (1995, 1998, Mann 2007), have spoken to capitalism’s artificial creation of needs and desires. As well, statistically, we can never say 100% of the time that something is true (Frankfort-Nachmias and Leon-Guerrero 2002, 439-440). If someone stops partaking of food, will they die? Statistically the probabilities are against them. Even for needs as seemingly universal such as food consumption, one can find exceptions --- Hira Ratan Manek (and others) after several years of gazing at the sun now claims to not consume food any longer (2007). Hence, for these various reasons, particularly that no *need* can be said to always be universal, in the search for universally applicable theory, or something very close to it, I am forced to definitionally combine “needs” and “wants,” for both can in part or in whole carry the common central meaning of “to desire.” Thus, in the remainder of this analysis – consider them the exact same thing.

Life versus living

A deeper analysis of the following quote by Lynch and an exploration of the conflicting nature of the ideas associated with this quote may help one to better understand how all needs fit under one universal umbrella of *orientation* and are not separate at all. The quote ends a section in which Lynch expounded the glories of several places that ze has personally cherished a great deal.

...the city should be so in the best sense: made by art, shaped for human purpose. It is our ancient habit to adjust to our environment, to discriminate and organize perceptually whatever is present to our senses. Survival and dominance based themselves on this sensuous adaptability, yet now we may go on to a new phase of this interaction. On home grounds, we may begin to adapt the environment itself to the perceptual pattern and symbolic process of the human being. (95)

The above quote speaks much of how people might be driven to interact with a location. First of all, humans “discriminate and organize perceptually [for] survival and dominance” and then later on “adapt the environment to ... the perceptual pattern and symbolic process of the human being.” So, first, humans alter the environment for their physical survival and, second, to find or give meaning to being – to give meaning to existence. Some theorists, such as Maslow with his pyramid-hierarchy of needs, do not necessarily think of human needs in such a simple way (Sternberg 1997). Perhaps this paragraph harkens to Lynch’s idea that first people use image for way-finding and then to give meaning to their lives (Lynch 1960, 125). Whatever the case, the common thread through all of this is human beings have needs that they want fulfilled – whatever they happen to be.

Returning to Lynch though, during environmental interaction, first people deal with the desire for survival, second the desire to give meaning to their lives. His statement about “art” and “human purpose” is perhaps also important to explore.

Contemplating the meaning of “art” conjures in the mind phrases like ‘personal creativity’ or ‘skillfulness,’ but may also more broadly be considered a symbolic dialogue about life’s meaning; it sounds like the *need* to live beyond cold survival. But conversely “human purpose” may cover both desire for survival and to find greater meaning. People sense or perceive the world and alter it according to their “human purpose,” for what they desire, for what they want or need, whether that is the desire for survival or to find greater meaning.

This quote above also says that the world in the survival-mind has a “sensuous adaptability.” So, people adapt what they are able to sense with their senses. To go further, in another passage ze says that “...Conscious design [is] the deliberate manipulation of the world for sensuous ends” (116). Perhaps ze is saying here that people alter the world to *sense* or *experience* it in new and different ways. But is this experience of sensuality not inclusive of a desire for survival — the desire to experience life and not death? Whether survival is something conscious, arguably, survival is a sensuous need.

Well, what about food then? – the experience of hunger, or to satisfy a sexual hunger, or the desire to sleep? Fulfillment of such desires may be universal. These are survival-based desires. Or what about autonomic bodily functions such as breathing, digestion, menstruation, sneezing, heart pumping, eyes blinking. Perhaps then there is something to what Lynch says that first we survive, but then we experience that survival. That once living, then, we live *to* give meaning to that survival. — This seems rather capitalist in its consumerist nature and I am tempted to argue that instead, we first survive, but simultaneously, we experience that survived life. That the two are not necessarily separate.

Perhaps our hungers are simply the desire to live, that we might know—to know life, to end the terror of not knowing. Yes, one desires to fill their tummy, but they also desire to taste every good thing. And when the body awakens in the morning and eyes are autonomically open and see, they desire to see diverse things. And with a cup of stimulating drink or nicotine inhaled, very much, it is the desire to know once again that a particular unique perception is true. We live to experience the orientation associated with differentiation. Thus, ultimately, the *only* human need is to live to know one’s orientation in the universe. As such, contrary to Lynch’s propositions, one might conclude that life and living are fused as being the same, it is in the quantification of life that survival is made separate from a life of meaning (Bonanno 1977, 6-8).

Still, returning to Lynch’s ideas concerning needs, besides the need to alter things to experience them in new ways, “for sensuous ends,” for Lynch may more specifically mean ‘to *satisfy* one’s sundry senses.’ Whatever Lynch’s meaning though, as some may advocate such a philosophy and its applicability to the immediately previous paragraphs—I include some further investigation into the meaning of “satisfaction” and how it may actually strongly relate to orientation. Such a *satisfaction* of the senses might come in the form of a mere repetition of a stimulus, or in the saturating of the self by such stimulus. Certainly over repetition may in some regards lead to boredom, frustration, anger, or neurosis. Except for perhaps addictions and brainwashing, appeasing of the senses by any means, by receiving the same input repeatedly or in saturation, or in experiencing all kinds of new and different stimuli, when stimuli are satisfying, by reason it may be because it *causes* some sort of mental processing within, a constant processing and

comprehending of existence to an ever larger extent, an end to the terror of not knowing one's location in the grid of life and this world. In another way, such a constant quenching may to a person be a comforting, continued affirmation of their existing orientation in the universe – the repeated assurance of knowing with surety one's defined location — mentally, socially, and physically.

From another standpoint, arguably, one might conclude that a new or repeated experience may perhaps be not a processing or an affirmation, but more so, with or without emotion, an experience *of the moment*. This too perhaps harkens to the idea that life and living are not separate. This perspective may also lead one to conclude that satisfaction and meaning are very relative to the person, especially to one's personal socialization of how one interprets existence, and their moments in it. More will be spoke of this in subsequent sections.

Generally thus far within this section, one can see, after one transcends the variableness of pluralized needs, how all need fulfillment or satisfaction may at its core be simply a need to experience orientation in this life.

Orientation versus capitalism

Related to the discussion above, in another passage of Lynch, this time within his conclusion, he conceivably speaks of an additional variety of needs, that perhaps ought to be addressed in relation to ownership-based orientation. In this quote, Lynch pronounces as the main message of his book, that “a large city environment can have sensuous form,” and, to summarize his in that brief conclusion, he says that such “sensuous form” speaks to people's highest desires and hopes, and invites viewers to explore the world (119). Here, highest desires and hopes, I am inclined to believe he was not speaking of the limitless life associated with a postmodern anarchy, but more likely, one might infer, that it is based on sociological, capitalist-driven conceptions of right and wrong. Many of these have already been explored, within this work, such as the *immorality* associated with ownership and the *righteousness* associated with charity and benevolence.

Highest desires and hopes may also speak to the grand and spectacular abundance associated with ownership or it may mean the hope for such abundance. Or Lynch may have meant otherwise, but when one considers, especially many pre-WWII Normativists—many of them too sought for people to be lifted perhaps to experience a sense of public ownership as their cities glistened with grandeur.

Whatever the case may be, the need or desire to experience the greatest good, the highest morality, based on ownership-driven sociological values of “right” and “wrong”—this too may very well differ from person to person as everyone uses different unique features to take their orientational bearings in life. For a moment, contrast this construct with the desire to explore the world which is possibly at its core a desire for survival orientation, to experience and understand differentiations, making all things more legible in one's mind to subdue the terror of a world perceptibly in chaos (125). In this juxtaposition of conclusions is revealed perhaps two conflicting values: A sociological, variable need/value (highest desires), and a knowledge-seeking, terror-mending need/value (understanding). Surely, terror mending through psychological-spatial interpretation may be greatly tied up in the sociological values sewn in one's mind. And in this interwoven conflict of values, as a sociological value of ownership could unconsciously force cognitive dissonance

upon one as one perceives the world and their place in it, this is additionally a reason to discount the larger capitalist society's values of "good" and "bad" in the theories of meeting people's needs.

Altogether, given the idea that to find the lowest common design denominator, theoretically one must abandon a much as possible the needs that vary from person to person – the numerous variables of human *desires* and constructs of *sociological values* – because they are not universally guaranteed — given this, let us recall, once more, the three parts of image and the key reasons for image. The three parts of image are *Identity* – distinctiveness, *Structure* – how it relates to other things, and *Meaning* – “practical or emotional” (8). Lynch also says that way finding is the number one reason for environmental image, and that emotional association is second (125). And though meaning is not married to any certain form (9), if adroitly we overlay these theoretical parts and seek to unravel the common threads, one might be lead to conclude, simply, that people use environmental image to meet their *need* for way-finding (survival) and their *need* for experience of emotional meaning — that is, if survival and meaning are even separate. I conclude that they are not and thus the only need is to live a life without chaos—a life of knowing. From examining Lynch the purpose of all human design is to meet the need to experience orientation in the world and that meaning is a product of this orientation, good or bad.

The next section will examine in more detail the moralities of the perceptibly good and bad, and the orientation that the non-physical provides us. It will eventually be shown that because, even at the root where needs are dissolved into the perception of orientation, as perception of the physical and non-physical itself is variable from person to person, that for an environmental designer to meet even the need for orientation may be an impossible task.

Non-physical Differentiations and their Meanings

In this section, I more fully look into non-physical differentiations, especially their negative meanings and meanings which transcend time, space, and physical design. Like differences in the physical environment, non-physical differentiations also carry the three parts of image.

In this section, first I give some examples of how the meaningfulness of a location's image, not linked to *any* gratification of desires, can be deeply negative. This sheds great light on helping an environmental designer to construct a personal anarchist morality. Secondly, to help sharpen the clarity of understanding that meaning is purely to do with personal perception of unique differentiation, through examples, I introduce how the definition of “image” (as being highly unique and very easy to recognize), how this definition can transcend physical locations and because it can do this transcendence, that “image” is *only* thought, and thus meaning is *only* determined by the *personal* perception of uniqueness. All of these are scarcely addressed by Lynch, but their import in relation to the other conclusions of herein and their professional applications is critical.

Transcending morals

A place can be very meaningful, but morally may not fulfill any needs (except as the ultimate need is orientation). When a point of orientation changes or is challenged and we then place a negative association with it, it not only carries increased meaning, but this also actually enhances our perceptions of orientation (See figure 11). Negative meanings, not fulfilling any desires we have, do enhance our perceptions — because they create unique difference. In one way they are disorienting us, but simultaneously they are all the more heightening our orientation. So what is placed on creating positive places, and with so little conversation about what positive and negative really are (only ownership-based romanticized conversations about “place”), it may be valuable to explore this more.

Critical theory is not bound by the dualism of morality, but instead looks to understand the complicated nature of all relationships. Dichotomies are merely oversimplifications, usually stemming from a theoretical framework that is agenda driven, rather than from one’s true desire to comprehend our world and our relationship to it. (Morefus 2006, 9)

Morality is deeply personal and highly variable. The possibility of transcending morals, is important to understand, because theoretically, for a designer, drawing lines of right and wrong may be very tempting, but it cannot just enslave and denigrate the lives of others through acts of ownership, and such morality can also preclude them from understanding that tremendous meaningfulness can be associated with both non-physical characteristics and gross immorality. As well, understanding how morality both positively and negatively functions can help an anarchist planner and designer to see a situation with more understanding to thus create and aid others in creating greater positive meaning in people’s lives through the environment.

Meaning is a moral judgement which can both challenge our orientation and enhance it. Below I share two anecdotal stories of non-physical orientational challenges; oddly, they both involve churches of people’s childhood.

Some time ago, I haphazardly met someone who expressed that one of the most meaningful locations of their lifetime was somewhere which they absolutely despised. They said that at the church building they attended as a child they were instilled with such great guilt and fear which they now, as an adult, did not believe in, and yet, in spite of their dreadful memories, it has remained for them a location of great significance and one of the most meaningful locations of their lifetime.

The second story was told to me by a very dear friend, Jenny Ann Cortina (2006). Ze told me that as a young child at the church ze attended, that when hir parents would leave hir at the Sunday School while they attended the main services in the sanctuary upstairs, that, though this may have been quite irrational, as a child ze typically felt an immense amount of anxiety and fear in that room — that hir parents were leaving hir there *forever* and would *never* return. As irrational as this may have been, that location in the church and particularly that room, now far away in time and space, still holds a prominent place in hir childhood memory.

In both of these given instances, these people experienced some *perception* that was very different than at any other locations they had been, or perhaps any

other locations ever. What they experienced was nothing positive or morally “good” in their memory. In fact, the perception of these places challenged their self-orientation in the world. People may experience any number of negative feelings in a given location: terror, fear, jealousy, anger, hate – some based in ownership orientations (jealously, anger), others not. From the examples above, the rooms and buildings may not have been designed very differently than many other similar locations, but the primary meaning, significance, or prominence in memory came through their perception of great difference. They experienced something different there, more different than anywhere else they knew and so in memory attached that experience to their imaging of that location. From this one might moreover conclude that, regardless of physical design and regardless of moral judgement, the greater the perception of difference, the more imageable and prominent that location is in the memory. Moral self-orientation manifests in many other ways too.

Some people like challenges as they help them to perhaps feel more oriented, more knowing of unique differences, and so they do not see such challenges as all that bad. They may perilously climb sheer faced mountains, but then they *know* that mountain in a new way and *know* that they are capable of climbing it. Someone else might like to try new foods, but with the possibility of knowing what they do like and what they do not. Others may not like to try new foods, but enjoy partaking in what they do know, for it reinforces their perceptions of orientation. Somewhat relatedly, some challenges to orienting the self are so huge that the person does not want to even go near it. They see its ominous presence, threatening a massive life-disorientation, and so they steer clear (*Anti-Mass: Methods of Organization for Collectives*, 11). This might be a person choosing to drive very slowly down an icy road in a heavy snow storm or a woman choosing to not go down a street that is not well lit – avoiding the threat of disorienting bodily harm; or a religious parishioner who ardently chooses not to explore doctrines which would challenge his lifelong beliefs; or a threat to orientation might even evoke violence such as when someone brutally beats a homosexual because that person is a grave threat to their position, their orientation of male dominance and ownership. Though these brief examples are quite diverse, each of these instances are about unique, interwoven perceptions of difference which allow orientation in the world, and each thus carries unique meanings. And terrible and disorienting as these experiences are, they have the effect of enhancing orientation. The car wreck on a snowy road home, the rape or beating on the dark street, the conversation at a park about religion — the traumatic events, moments of immense difference, are forever etched with the locations in which they occurred. These examples also very much help one to understand that meaning is morally variable, and depends upon your personal points of orientation.

These examples may additionally help a designer to construct a personal morality. If meaning and its morality are so highly personal as it is clearly *not always* linked to physical design and as it is reinforced by perceptual additions and disorienting challenges to it, the only thing a designer has control over in the end is creating perceptible, *physical* uniqueness to create meaning or allow its circumstantial attachment. And so assuming a world in an anarchist, ownership-less state, if there is anything to guide the designer, difference creation is perhaps the only slightly possible morality.

Transcending physical design through time, events, and thought

To reiterate, notwithstanding a designer's best efforts to create distinctive, meaningful locations, personal perception can of course still trump any actual physical design. Image may be very tied up in the physical design, but image may be both physical perception and thought, or simply thought alone. Lynch actually confessed such a reality in a statement about the third component of image, "So various are the individual meanings of a city, even while its form may be easily communicable, that it appears possible to separate meaning from form" (9). So according to Lynch, meaning is not necessarily married to any certain form. This section is to help reveal, beyond non-physical morals, that meaning is not always linked to physical design, but often related to people, events, thought, and passage of time.

Time is a variable of perception that transcends physical design. Time may have perceptual effects such as healing a negative perception of an image, be it of a person, location, thing, or idea. Time may also allow negative perceptions about an image to fester until they explode. As one interacts with a location or thing over time—in one's mind, the image may soon drip heavy with layers upon layers of meaning as the unique stories of interaction (the stories of one's life) become intertwined with their imaged surroundings. In the mind, regardless of "good" or "bad," the non-physical quality of time can affect one's perceived image.

Kevin Boulding (1956) spoke to this also of how time and the change in one's expectations alter the images of the world which we carry (4, 6, 18). Interestingly, as already mentioned, attachment theorists in the field of psychology have also concluded this, that as time and events transpire and factors of our most unique relationships with people and places change and evolve, the value that we assign to that uniqueness is so great and many times that uniqueness acts as such a sterling point of orientation in our existence that when the qualities of that uniqueness change in our minds or otherwise, we experience loss, grief, and disorientation as an immense ballast of orientation in our lives has changed or is suddenly gone. In time, we are able to adjust, the old image evolves to carry an historical symbolic value, and we use that transformed value and as well reach out to draw more strongly upon other unique people, places and things to experience orientation in life once again (Marris 1982, 195). Thus, mental processing over time appears to affect the morality of perception. Perceptions of places can also vary according to the personal experience of movement, events, and accompanying thought perception.

Lynch reveals how he had conducted several studies in which a variety of people each drew a map of a given location. Each valuing certain environmental elements over other elements, each map was different, emphasizing that each person had different mental perceptions of similar geographic areas. Of course there were overlapping commonalities, but their mental maps were each unique unto themselves.

As anyone negotiates the physical environment, the journey through it is rarely static. Boulding (1956) also spoke much of this that as a person moves, the perceived image is changing around them and, mentally, they are making new notes about the features, objects, people, events, memories, and ideas about which they perceive, all the while interpreting, processing, and re-placing these notes within the

mind. For in the mind is the image, and those images are more than the physical features and objects. Returning to the definition of image, the image or place is the perception of the *highly unique*, which is *very easy to recognize*, and each of those unique perceptions carry with them the three parts of image — they carry a unique quality, they have an association with other perceptions, and they carry some degree of meaning — of weighted moral value, which either challenges or reinforces existing orientation. Lynch was applying image mostly to physical features, but image perception clearly goes beyond the physical. And though very often connected to physical locations, so many images are not grounded to solid physical design.

People are images and part of larger images. “Remarkable and unmistakable” locations (92) are like the friend that you instantly recognize by their face, their gestures, the ideas they tend to speak of, the sound of their voice, and even the personal cadence of their walk from a distance. Because of their unique qualities, they are unmistakable to you. They are a clear sure *image*, a typically quite mobile one, but often highly unique, very easy to recognize.

Events are images, usually associated with physical locations, but the meaning of a location may be linked to the event and have very little to do with the physical design of that location. To reference something more recent, Dolores Hayden in her book *The Power of Place* (1995) speaks of this phenomenon as well. Ze shows that it does not matter how slight the difference in design, people appear to find meaning no matter what, and that such meaning is oftentimes highly personal. One example might be to imagine that there is a spot of beach where you made love to a life partner of your for the very first time. This spot of beach may not have been all that different from any other spot along that stretch of 200 miles of beach, but that particular location, off the main highway, upon the beach below, now holds an immense amount of meaning in your life. Regarding this location’s physical design, how the location’s spacial elements are arraigned probably plays very little into the meaningfulness of that location. You probably recognize the location by a small highway marker and a peculiar, twisted-looking clump of cypress trees at the trailhead leading down to the beach, but the predominant things in your memory are the activities of that day and conversations that transpired. Lynch spoke some to this, of how different unique attributes synergistically make a location even more unique and valued (Lynch, 135). It would be easy to conclude from this that when the physical design of a location is increasingly highly unique, it could have the synergistic effect of making memories of unique events all the unrivaled; from that one might infer that a highly unique location makes it much easier to attach unique memories to those particular locations, but in this instance of the beach, the physical differences were extremely slight, and the stronger meanings were in the unique events attached. Though, beaches generally are a unique landform that no doubt would be a stirring backdrop.

In the instance above, the event is part of that location, and your perception of that location is probably *very different* than the perceptions of others who have visited that beach. Also, with this event and the rather tragic stories of the churches — *image* is a memory. Perhaps, you boldly asked a passerby on the beach to take a picture of you and your partner, naked together on the beach. Now that picture adorns a small secluded spot on the wall of your closet. When you see the picture, caught up in the memory, you are no longer standing in the closet, but for a few moments transported back to that distant time and place. In the memory, the *image*

transcends time and space.

Maybe there are particular ideas associated with a place. Perhaps too, on this beach, unusually, you had a conversation about the Pythagorean Theorem and for the first time realized that all the right angles everywhere were potentially made possible by that one discovery. That single realization is now also attached to that location, but thought may not always be even attached to the physical.

When one considers the mental formulation of theory, the act of solving a math problem in one's head, or the enjoyment of food, the experience of listening to a piece of music, or the experience of dreaming – all of these things might be experienced in connection with a physical location, but, like being caught up in the memory of the beach, for each of these, one might get so caught up mentally in the experience that one is perceptually no longer in that physical locale. For a time, the images one perceives are *only* thought.

So, because of this transcendent quality of image (the experience of the unique), because it can transcend time, distance, and physical existence — because perception is rarely, if ever, a purely physically-imageable experience, *personal* perception of difference appears to be the only determinant of meaning/value.

Applications and Future Research

To this point, I have explored and clarified Lynchian design theory and deduced numerous additional concepts based heavily upon it. In summary, unique differentiations create meaning/orientation and challenges to that orientation determine if that orientation is positive or negative. Such interpretations also strongly point to the uniqueness of personal perception and thus personal morality.

These conclusions lead one to the threshold of several trailheads. The first is that of design standards. Given that perception is so highly personal, should there be any sort of standards? The second path is, if there should not be any standards, then what approaches should an anarchist planner and designer take? And finally, given the conclusions thus far, what directions might be taken now regarding future research?

Standards

When considering design standards in the deduction of the universal, one cannot consider them because even they have the possibility of variation. “Well what about the things we do have in common?” or “What about at least minimal functional design standards?” In the possible journey to discover the universal — the lowest theoretical common denominator(s) — if something cannot be said to be *always* certain, then, arguably, perhaps it should be dropped from consideration.

Lynch acknowledges the diversity of people and perception. Ze advocates building cities for *all* types of people, to satisfy all (90, 157). In anarchy though, it is people building their world for themselves, not people living some life of sterilized environmental disconnection. Along this line of thinking, to design cities for all, so often designers want to create things and locations that satisfy the sundry perceptions and desires of all.

One of course might, as Lynch suggests, think of these desires in such simplicity as *to survive* and *to find meaning*, or we might take it to the length of

Maslow's pyramid (Sternberg 1997) or in a different realm, Covey's four needs (1999). In the following example, for a moment cease to consider them in such structured ways, but merely as a broad spectrum of 'average' needs. An environmental designer might think that a variety of seating, a water feature, and a food vendor in an urban plaza are key to people entering and lingering in their plaza. Such a seating design is fulfilling an average need to sit and rest however one feels to repose; these may help fulfill desires for physical rest. Also, such design meets a need to find some elemental connection to nature – found in the sight, smell, sound, and touch of water (perhaps so missing in a quantified, disconnected, owned world). The food vendor supplies the need for physical nourishment and sensual pleasure to the pallet. Synergistically working together the three bring many people to gather in one location – fulfilling any number of social needs (Whyte 1980). Such approaches, as Whyte's which ask designers to fulfill some constructed list of variety, comfort, and connection needs, still do not reach into the theoretical core of desire fulfillment—unique physical designs to aid one in their orientations in this universe. In this example above of plaza design, the environment is used to fulfill more 'average' needs or desires. This example may be valid for some, but what about those who have the desire to be alone, to be away from crowds and noise. For them, this location is one that may not agree with what they personally desire. Lynch gives another example.

Designers often seek to fulfill a human desire for, in the following case, a specific variety of psychological comfort. Lynch states that familiarity is comforting (Lynch, 127). A designer may seek to mimic or echo the familiar, because it can be so very comforting — arguably, affirming orientation. The designer may try to weave in known images, stories, histories, names (127) to tap into nostalgia, often a patterned, ownership-driven nostalgia. But in spite of their efforts, different people still perceive the same city differently (87). Some people may like things to change, may like new things. They may like to see a location totally remade in a new way. Still, too much change all at once may bring resentment by some people – and may leave ghosts and scars in the mental image (45), throwing off their orientation. So many different perceptions! It leads one to possibly believe that there should be some degree of balance between environmental change and sustaining and perpetuating old patterns of design so that people do not lose their sense of orientation. Such a conclusion of seeking balance is off-balance though in that, theoretically, still, no one place can satisfy the desires of all.

How does one create, then, a city for all people? Lynch says that because there are so many ways that one might perceive the environment, we should seek to create environments which can easily be interpreted by and be satisfying to all (157). Still, no matter the location, human perception is flexible and adaptable – humans find their way under the most chaotic circumstances (133), *and* people see different or use different elements to find their way – depending on culture, socio-economic status, mobility, etc. (49). Theoretically satisfying all, in such a context, appears to not be possible; if people are all perceiving and interacting with the environment in a multitude of ways, then logically a designer cannot be completely sure of the effect of any design!

Similarly, some theorists, such as, for example, Modernists or contemporarily New Urbanists, believe that there is a certain design format that will be compatible with more people than not. Lynch suggests a format too, for both

interpreting and constructing our environment – using his five elements. In relation to this, such systems of design may help us recognize various differentiations and resultantly often provide for some certain desires to be satisfied in some degree — though clearly, not *always*.

As well, from an anarchist perspective, it is not actually possible to create cities for everyone in an ownership society as the *limited quality* of the-quantification-of-all-things cannot satisfy everyone. Moreover, given all of the above, for the anarchist planner and designer:

...standards and values are best understood – that is they are most *useful* – as approximations, shortcuts, conveniences. They may summarize a certain practical wisdom won by social experience. Then again, they may be the self-serving dictates of authority, or once-useful formulations which, in changed circumstances, no longer serve any anarchist purpose or any good purpose. (Black 2004, 6)

Thus, standards ought to perhaps be valued as knowledge to draw from when formulating new designs, but not necessarily essential to the outcome of anything. Holding to them tightly can breed a maze of undifferentiated repetition, unbound from them can unleash differentiation and meaning untold, even though, considerably, physical design may have little to no impact on the enhancement of meaningfulness.

Approaches to design — Increasing the meaning

Based on what has been presented in the last sections, if physical design may not matter at all because in the end it all comes down to personal perception, and given that meaning and the morality of meaning are thus relative to the individual, what should an anarchist planner and designer use if nothing really matters? Well, if *meaning at its core is a perception of unique difference*, then at the least, to *help* create the most meaningful sites and experiences possible, logically, one would seek to create locations and things that are perceptually very unique in relation to the things around it and even to anything anywhere, or produce locations that will induce or prompt such perceptions and greater orientation. Because physical design does matter *sometimes*, just not all the time, it might be good to simply make the best of it and at least enhance the *possibility* of increased meaning. This appears to be the only thing that one can do. One might also delve deeply into morality below, but like standards which so much vary from person to person, I do not sense it to be very productive at this point. In any case though, being aware of how morality functions can help one to work within one's self and with others to help understand one's present dominant reference points and build out differentiations from there. This appears the only thing that one can do. So may the hopeful enhancement begin. Below I will reiterate, expand, and also share more of what Lynch has to say about these matters.

If the perception of uniqueness increases the power or meaning, then, reasonably, if one applies various techniques to increase these unique physical-perceptions, meaning may also likely increase.

I have already touched on several theoretical constructs of Lynch and derivatives of them which one might use to increase the levels of unique perception:

The three parts of image, the ten ways to apply the three parts of image, the five elements, the circle of chaos and order, and the moral spectrum construct. There are also many physical and non-physical ways related to these.

In one passage mentioned earlier, Lynch says that something found nowhere else reinforces the already existing specialness of a site (135). So, if a location is already quite special (perceptually unique), one might make it even more so by adding a singularly unique feature. On the same page, ze also calls attention to the idea that “a landscape may be so fantastically differentiated so as to compel attention” (135). Lynch gives the example of the bank of a certain river which had a profound variety of different shaped and colored river stones. Thus, could one not only make a location different from those around it, but one could do so by creating such great differentiation within that location (in this case a river bank) that, simply, the contrast within increases the larger *structural* differentiations. In a similar vein, one may invert this idea to create a location near unto devoid of details, like a sea, or a salt flat, though from a designing standpoint these may be unrealistically titanic in size. Still, on smaller scales, a location devoid or nearly devoid of details absolutely can provide a contrasting perception of unique differentiation from the locations around it, or from any other locations anywhere. Thus, differentiation in *structure* is very much enhanced. Many non-physical means may certainly also increase the perception of unique differentiation.

“Once a history, a sign, or a meaning attaches to an object, its value as a landmark rises.” (81) Like adding more details to an already complex equation, again, coupling diverse things together increases a thing’s perceived uniqueness and value (in this instance a non-physical thing to a physical).

Relatedly, names may add value. This was also mentioned as part of the ten ways to apply the three parts of image, but the implications are worth reiterating and expanding on below. Lynch declares that places with the greatest meaning have many named details and that “the very naming and distinguishing of the environment... adds to the depth and poetry of the human experience” (139, 126). Naming is a form of interaction that attaches a unique specific memory to a physical location. Naming is also a way of formally recognizing a unique location or thing. One may name any types of images, physical and non-physical, defined with tangible and intangible definitions and meanings. “Frog,” and “deer,” are general names for specific types of mobile things. “Michael,” a dear friend, is a specific mobile location/person. Another friend named their treasured automobile “Zeus.” “The Griffith Observatory” is a fixed, specific, unique location. “The L.A. County Fair” is a notable event and location. “My shopping list” or “quadratic equations” are non-physical thoughts/images that could take a physical form. The unique naming designates uniqueness, and through association may evoke even greater perceived value to already unique features, people, larger locations and ideas.

Actually, the statement above about “the depth and poetry of the human experience” is quite vast a statement; I have already touched on this “human experience,” but Lynch does not categorically delve into hir metaphorical use of the word “poetry.”

Ze also uses it elsewhere to say that people should create “new groupings, new meanings, and new poetry” in the environment (139). This is certainly an advocacy of increased environmental differentiation, but I believe that to understand what written poetry is may help in understanding how to create greater

environmental differentiation. Lynch was writing through a modernist lense and postmodern thought had not entered the stage of dialogue in hir day. Thus the poetry ze spoke of was more likely the highly structured variety and not the postmodern freeform so predominant today. Poetry in Lynch's time was largely about placing words in particular ways to make it easier to read and remember. Using the natural rhythm of syllable emphasis and de-emphasis, the words were arraigned so as to repeat a given number of patterns of emphasis and de-emphasis throughout the lines. In such a context, typically each line is structured to have the same number of a repeated segment of rhythm. Repeated rhymes are also often but not always incorporated. These rules are not hard and fast, but are rather standard. When rules of rhythm or rhyme are broken, it often is to deliberately make a point or to generally add twists of variety to the highly structured poem – adding differentiation. In this style, one might also add variety by breaking grammatical rules in order to conform to the set rhythm (Quinn 1982). The effect of these techniques is that they speak a particular dialogue, message, or story in a unique rhythmic and sometimes rhyming way (Reeves 1962).

If one were to take this to the realm of physical design, on any scale, one might seek to incorporate a specific, repeated, unique characteristic to distinguish that location. And to take an additional lesson from the poetry, one may want to break the rules occasionally to add variety, meaning, at all scales of differentiation. One might also seek to incorporate some non-physical rhythmic poetry into a location, perhaps in the form of street names or predominant land-use throughout an area, though non-fixed physical characteristics can rhythmically manifest themselves without one even trying – as in the type of people or animals drawn to a particular location. Perhaps every house on the block has cats. Rhythm of a location may also occur in the movements of people directionally, socially, daily, and seasonally. These are all usually very much a part of nearly every location (Lynch, 86) and a designer might want to be aware of them so as to uniquely play off of them through design. As unique characteristics overlap in a location, it makes that site all the more valued.

Among other non-concrete characteristics, a location may be flooded with symbolism or religious/spiritual/magical value (138). As one may recall, “value,” as associated with morality and meaning, is the degree to which a differentiation reinforces or challenges orientation. If an environmental differentiation has a symbolic value, it represents some other differentiation(s) (physical or non-physical). The symbolism may be very simple, or if something is inundated with symbolism, a specific differentiation may represent a multitude of or a great complex array of other differentiations, which either reinforce or challenge one's orientation. Site enhancement through incorporating symbols may be done as one understands the symbols and values of the self, of the larger society, and of the subcultures within the larger society. To give a personal example of this, for some time I have attended an Episcopal church near my home. A dominant image there hanging above the alter is a handmade (by one the parishioners) replica of the San Damiano Crucifix Cross of St. Francis of Assisi. The cross represents a larger ecumenical belief in the purported sacrifice of Jesus. In my parish, the cross does carry that meaning to many, but it is also a differentiation which is rather unique to that particular parish. As my faith has evolved over time, the image of the person of Jesus painted in detail on the cross there carries less meaning to me than the *very distinctive shape* of this

particular cross. Now, for me, in my mind, that shape symbolizes the parish and the many people I know there. In the flat where I live, to remind me of my many dear friends at the parish, but also my movement away from traditional beliefs there, I have hung the unadorned shape of the parish cross painted merely in a dark color. Hanging that cross (a single physical differentiation) in my dwelling represents to me a very specific physical location, my own movement of faith away from traditional beliefs of that church, a multitude of non-physical relationships and events associated with that place, and a valuing of my continued participation and friendships there. Again, this is an example of symbolism in things, but also the use of existing differentiations to build out from to create new differentiations and thus to realize new meanings, new or expanded orientations.

Symbolic value can be found in nearly everything as the physical world drips more and more heavy with the story of our lives. Differentiations become connected to and even inextricably intertwined with other differentiations and together they aid us in orienting ourselves in this existence, and they aid us in having a conversation with ourselves about our orientation in this existence (Marcus 1995), thus helping us to better get our bearings. Yes, one may desire to create the surreal beyond imagination, but one may also desire to be more aware of both personal and societal symbolic values which are used to find one's way, then to play off these differentiations, as in the example above, by layering or contrasting one's individual designs with them to create new differentiations to increase the meaning — essentially taking existing way-finding differentiations, and building out from those differentiations to create the new. This may allow people to more easily find their way into new differentiations without necessarily being dramatically disoriented. Many others, such as semioticians, have theorized and researched symbols to a great extent, what they mean and how they function (Baudrillard 1995, 1998, Mann 2007, Debord 1973, Marshall 1992, Koehnlein 2007).

Much related to this, Lynch says also that citizens should inform the physical environment with meanings and connections and be involved with the development processes (92). Here, additional value is derived from one's attached unique personal interaction, layering their minds with stories of the sites unto which they have interacted. This would also be enhanced in an anarchist existence in that people may become directly involved in the local creation and alteration of their shared environment.

This next point is made also by attachments theorists—as interconnections (of any form) multiply, the rigidity of image increases too (Lynch, 89, Marris 2004). Related to the second aspect of the three parts of image, people identify how one unique location relates to the peerless other locations around it, and as unique interconnections may be made, the location carries increasingly unique spatial relationships. And when relational characteristics change or when people perceive additional reference points for their minds, it increases their perception of locational difference. This may not always be true though, one might also increase the meaningfulness of a location by differentiating through having uniquely *limited* connections with other locations, being introverted (Lynch, 77-78). Perhaps there is a religious temple that only has a single entrance. Such non-connectiveness of image may also occur in non-physical realms, and even in an ownership way. For instance, in a non-physical social construct in which certain knowledge is held by only a few, the non-connectiveness and *unique exclusivity* of that knowledge might cause them

to value the image of that knowledge all the more. How might one apply that to a location? – perhaps attach the acquisition of some specific, perhaps quite unique, knowledge to a very unique physical building or classroom. Just like specific events are easier to attach mentally to a location when the location is very unique, so too, it may be likely with information or knowledge itself – contrived or otherwise.

If one did decide to focus on need fulfillment (over simply orientation), certainly that is a possible direction. Lynch said that “an environment should be geared ... to satisfy the varying demands of the individuals who inhabit it” (Lynch, 90). One may want to ask themselves what they desire, then seek to fulfill that desire through physical design, but do so in as unique a way as possible—building on the existing orientation and helping to proliferate unique design, thus strengthening orientation.

In a different turn, one might also expand their unique creativity in designing unique places by looking to their imagination, and to nature. Natural, wild land can be full of inspirationally unique examples to take back to one’s own drawing board and put one’s own distinctive twist on. The first things that come to my mind are some of the landforms of the Great Basin of the United States, particularly in Utah where I lived for a time, but certainly one might draw inspiration from virtually anywhere in nature.

The Great Basin and Southwest, generally, are marked prominently with unique landforms from water and wind eroding the sandstone over millennia. One might use an oddly shaped slot canyon in the San Rafael Swell as an inspiration for a unique street design, for a balcony upon one’s roof, for a small garden path between two buildings with a bench built into one of the walls, or inspiration for a curving hallway in one’s house, or the mantle of a fireplace, or the molding around a ceiling (see figure 13). The possible applications are diverse and at so many scales.




Fig. 13. Canyon view 1




Fig. 14. Canyon view 2

The shape of the canyon may inspire one to make some hallway walls not only curved, but also perhaps not at right angles to the ground, or to run a sky light from one end of a hallway to the other (see figure 14). In every way, every norm ought to be challenged.

One might also look to other creative works for ideas. Books such as *Great*

Streets (Jacobs 1995), *The Structure of the Ordinary* (Habraken 1998), and *A Pattern Language* (Alexander et al. 1977) are full of diverse ideas. Italo Calvino's *Invisible Cities* (1974) is overflowing with diverse tales of cities to fill the imagination. Any trip to a local art museum or gallery will certainly flood the mind with a multitude of design conceptions about colors, textures, shapes, thoughts and abstract ideas to help one mold a greater diversity into every location. The world awaits unique creations, and full of unique ideas and designs already, these may help stir the creative imagination.

Given the above, and with veritably no limits to the imagination, one may, as well, choose not to build upon the past and on what exists, but let the mind run free, to create differentiations reaching into the frighteningly surreal, which may at first fill the self and others with terror, but, based on that challenge to orientation, the self and others may likely find from it extremely positive meanings in their lives. Such a path means leaving behind every bit of fear of one's personal thoughts and embracing the reality of the visions and dreams within. Acknowledgment and then action to live and do and be. Reciprocally it means abandoning fear of others and other ways of being and doing. And overarchingly, it also means abandoning social constructs which are oppressive to the self and others, to thus allow that unspeakably surreal to exist and flourish.

The above are some simple existing ideas to possibly draw from. Generally, an anarchist planner and designer has a wealth of options before them to help proliferate the world with greater meaning. Lynch's ideas are a starting point, the symbols within the self and society take one the further to enhance one's orientation, rhythms of life/nature, and new creative ideas of the mind—bridging one into even more undiscovered country, and the surreal beyond the gates of imaginations opens to a world of the most profound, unspeakable meanings possible. Another question is, in the application of these theories, how does one best directly challenge the current capitalist world in which we live?

Future research while challenging the system

One of the major problems some may have with these theories is that they run counter to the moralities of most planning and design practices of today. Presently many theorists and practitioners are held captive by ownership's deeply penetrating gaze. So caught up in its vision, they are blinded to other possibilities. Given this situation though, as the heightening of orientation and the absence of ownership may be the only positive possible moralities, how does one best advocate such outcomes in contemporary capitalist circles?

An anarchist planner and designer may absolutely find solutions in the advocacy approaches of other contemporary anarchists. Certainly though, new approaches specifically oriented around planning and design ought to be developed to not only spread diverse design but approaches which would work to dissolve the system of oppression and inequality of which ownership is the core, and thus would allow these theories to thrive.

Future research must include how to best challenge the norms of sameness. Jane Jacobs once said, "Shall we zone to require conformity in appearance or to prohibit sameness?" (1972, 226) Any movement toward creating unexchangeable or less exchangeable diversity helps to thwart the system. An anarchist planners

working in the contemporary ownership-based world, to help eliminate the system from within, they might try developing new codes and guidelines for cities which frown on sameness and prompt greater diversity, and more especially which would move people toward the abandonment of ownership, government, and authority. In this cause, to aid in the transformation and help fill the city with greater meaning, planners might create templates of use and/or design, each one being very *different* than the next—creating a very diverse array of designs and uses throughout a single city. Some have tried something similar to this with the Transect model but not only does it focus predominantly on the regional scale, it more especially seeks to perpetuate the exchangeable known (Bohl and Plater-Zyberk 2006, Tagliaventi 2006). As planners and designers, we must see beyond that limited vista to encourage the creation of a far more extreme diversity of spaces, forms, and uses.

From another angle, city codes might somehow be rewritten to advocate common/anarchist spaces for all. Perhaps subtle regulations or programs might be developed to facilitate and/or encourage squatting of land and buildings, deliberate construction of aberrant built forms, spaces and land-uses, and an understanding of their immense social value. To both educate people and dissolve the system, planners have many tools at their disposal.

In advocacy/mediation work in which especially the planner must bridge the gap between capitalist exploitation and mercy unto human beings and the larger environment—at those times may often come opportunities to teach people where real meaning, fulfillment, and benefit are truly found and to facilitate all parties in their movement toward that end.

Again, such actions absolutely act toward dismantling the quantified capitalist world while helping to allow individual extremes to enter the picture. Logically, from a regulatory standpoint, the theories of this work of course point toward an eventual entire rethinking and reformulation of land-use planning and design as we know it. How does one plan cities in an anarchist world? Will we even call them cities? Certainly more theory needs to be explored, developed, and experimentation conducted which may more solidly bear out these concepts, though experimentation is a difficult postmodern thought in itself in that so often it is burdened by conceptualizations of ownership and the bias of unique personal perception (Landstreicher 2007, Stein and Harper 2003). More concepts though of universality of application such as the theories herein need to be developed and challenged.

Planners and designers somehow must also eventually make a mental shift from being enforcers, regulators, and imposers of plans to being playful suggestors of ideas. Inherent in the concept of play is the freedom to try different things, all in the absence of any fear. A major aspect of anarchist liberation is a life of limitless play, in which the capitalist division between work and “free time” is dissolved (Bonanno 1977, 17, 23). This division is similar to the aforementioned false division between life and living alluded to by Lynch (1960, 95, 125). As the world moves toward anarchy, and when it fully exists in anarchy, the planner and designer might suggest, in an act of play, various surreal plans for a collective to talk about and possibly work toward. This also logically carries into planners and designers helping people, collectives and individuals, to become planners and designers themselves. To dream and create. To tear down or build up. To release the monsters within. To run and play.

As well, as it is a universal principle that all meaning is a function of unique differentiation, this single idea has the potential to transcend these fields of environmental design, and be applicable to all forms of living. Its interdisciplinary nature may have far reaching effects that as planners and designers, we ought to be aware of. Certainly if one understands how meaning is created for people, one can logically draw inferences into creating multitudes of meaningful possibilities in other realms of application too.

Remarkably, there are so many ways of increasing the uniqueness of a location or anything to increase its perceptual meaning. Surely one could come up with endless combinations of unique perceptions — all heightening meaning all the more.

The Image of the City proposes many ideas, I believe this analysis sheds a fresh light on the vista of planning and Lynchian place theory. It helps expand the constituents of Lynch's image to a new level, to understand it as being applicable to postmodernism, anarchy, attachment theory, and to current planning practices, but most cumulatively it brings clarification to how orientation occurs and how the value of human meaning morally springs out of that orientation.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

At first glance, the ideas of Lynch prompt one to try to make cities more visually legible — to enhance way finding and meaning. Clearly a great many other deductions and postulations based on theoretical analysis are possible. This may be just the beginning.

Generally we find some relatively simple concepts in *The Image of the City*, but as one pulls those concepts apart and considers their applications and theoretical reasoning, individually and as a whole, the implications are radically vast.

The theories I postulate herein perhaps take us to a new precipice of understanding how “place” and its accompanying meanings function for all human beings, not only within capitalist realms, but far beyond them as well.

In this analysis we find that perception of image-difference, in whatever its form, is the key to all meaning creation. And in that single unique value rests all of our orientation and morality.

Following these postulations to their logical conclusion would mean the end of environmental design, and especially ownership-based urban planning as we know it. It would mean planning not for oppression in any form, but for a world with the ultimate in social and personal liberation; for the ultimate experience of personal and collective meaning; it would mean to see the world with new eyes—eyes that create difference for orientation’s sake, to fearlessly know and find one’s way in life, because that is the only value which matters.

In this thesis I take the unconventional approach of looking at environmental design from an anarchist perspective. I went to great lengths to convey from the literature how and why I might take this perspective. Others contemporarily who engage in writing may stay with conventional ownership-based perspectives which rest heavy in shared social assumptions. As this thesis aims at definition and clarity, I can only hope that this endeavor will aid in future research in the fields of planning and design to help provide an added voice of challenge to conventional assumptions and their ambiguity, that such a challenge to their morals would help them to find a stronger, more grounded orientation.

When I think of the horizon in the distance, the city of total liberation—of monstrous surreal dreams and living free of any forms of ownership and slavery, I see a new life for the planner and the designer, I see their motion and movement rushing to be more real and true to their moral selves than ever before. Gone will be the days of ownership-driven arbitrary and capricious planning to mitigate, and risen from the slain beast of oppression will be the living arbitrary of one’s own soul — the sole desire to know, without definitions, just to know difference, and to know it without limits, to know life without limits.

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